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An Unlikely Populist: Donald Trump and the Rhetoric of Elite and Minority Resentment 
Jared Quigley 
 
Abstract: 
         Populist rhetoric is a political language employed by individual leaders which divides the 
populace into two categories: a pure, moral people and a corrupt elite. In this paper, I examine 
Donald Trump as a populist, focusing on Moffit’s political style approach (Moffit 2016) and 
Mudde’s definition of populism as an ideology (Mudde 2004). Listening to speeches from the 
campaign, I study how the components of these definitions of populism apply to Trump. I also 
examine the groups that Trump defined as “the people,” “the elite,” and the “undeserving 
minority groups.” I argue that while Trump does exhibit certain behaviors expected of populists, 
he is far from a perfect fit into the existing definitions. Trump also attacks certain groups that 
have been attacked by past right-wing populists in America, but also includes new groups, 
namely donors, special interests, lobbyists, and “big business.” The mainly performative, 
exclusionary populism that Trump demonstrated on the campaign trail is dangerous to the civic 
health of a democracy as it attacks key institutions and norms and can be largely disconnected 
from actual policy outcomes. 
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Introduction 
        To win votes in elections, politicians invoke different rhetorical styles. Some employ 
soaring, optimistic rhetoric, while others depend on jeremiads or base their appeal on fear. As 
defined by political scientists, populists are those who divide the populace into two categories: a 
pure, moral people and a corrupt elite. Right-wing populists in America and Europe win votes by 
arguing that “the people” are being cheated by corrupt elites who favor undeserving minority 
groups over the rest of the people. Throughout Donald Trump’s rise from a politically incorrect 
real-estate developer to the White House, journalists, pundits, and other political actors tried to 
explain how he could keep winning primaries and eventually the general election while enduring 
controversies that would sink conventional politicians. A common refrain from those covering 
Trump was that he was a different kind of candidate, a populist.  
In this paper, I examine Trump as a populist by listening to 36 speeches during his 
presidential campaign, documenting how he uses populist rhetoric and which groups he attacks. I 
examine how political scientists have studied populism and how Trump fits into the existing 
definitions that political scientists have offered. I examine the groups that Trump defined as “the 
people,” “the elite,” and the “undeserving minority groups,” and document how and how often 
he mentions these groups in campaign speeches. The rhetoric and style of populism are 
important because they have been consistently present in American politics since the founding of 
the country, and Trump’s use of populist rhetoric and style could be a blueprint for right-wing 
populists in America for many years to come.  
There has been much debate in the field of political science concerning the definition of 
populism. The only constant in this debate is a dichotomy between “the elite” and “the people” 
(Cramer 2016, Jansen 2011, Laclau 2005, Moffitt 2016, Mudde 2004, Roberts 2016, Roberts 
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1995, Werner-Muller 2016, Weyland 2001). Outside of this basic dichotomy there is debate over 
whether populism is an ideology (Mudde 2004, Roberts 2016), a rhetoric (Brubaker 2017, Jansen 
2001), a political style (Brubaker 2017, Moffitt 2016), a political strategy (Weyland 2001), a 
mobilization (Jansen 2011), or a part of the historical development of developing nations (Di 
Tella 1965, Hennessy 1969, Spalding 1997). This debate has been raging since the emergence of 
the idea of populism in the field of political science during the 1960s and 70s (Jansen 2011). 
In this thesis, I begin by reviewing the scholarship on populism, from early works to the 
more contemporary and conflicting perspectives on it. I then launch into a description of the two 
most prominent competing perspectives, the ideological perspective and the performative 
perspective. I write a brief history of right-wing populism in the United States after World War 
Two, to identify the groups past right-wing populists in America have defined as “the elite,” “the 
people,” and the “undeserving minority groups.” In my research design, I identify the 
components of populism as seen in the definitions I apply to Trump, Mudde’s ideological 
definition and Moffitt’s performative definition.  
I next discuss my findings from the 36 campaign speeches that I listened to. I document 
how and how often Trump invoked “the people,” attacked elites, invoked a crisis of 
representation, targeted “others,” demonstrated bad manners, and bragged of a connection to the 
elite. I document how and how often Trump mentioned common sense, political correctness, 
support for or opposition to experts, an openness to negotiation and compromise, his opponents 
being evil, and his intention to begin a new party. I found that while Trump used populist 
rhetoric to an extent, he does not fit perfectly into existing definitions of populism, and this paper 
demonstrates the benefits and pitfalls of describing Trump as a “populist.” Furthermore, the 
mainly performative, exclusionary populism that Trump demonstrated on the campaign trail is 
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dangerous as it attacks key institutions and norms as well as being largely separated from actual 
policymaking. 
 
Historical and Contemporary Competing Perspectives on Populism 
        The scholarly debate among political scientists on the topic of populism has evolved over 
time and can be divided into three generations (Jansen 2011). Although the term was first used in 
reference to the People’s Party of the 1890s, a left-leaning agrarian party in America, the first 
generation of populism scholarship in the field of political science did not emerge until the 1960s 
and 1970s (Jansen 2011). This generation of scholars focused on populism as a historical part of 
either the modernization theory or structuralist Marxism (Di Tella 1965, Germani 1978, 
Hennessy 1969, Klaren 1973, Skidmore 1979, Spalding 1977, Waisman 1987). Those scholars 
“attempted to understand the social bases of support for classic populists...by focusing on the 
economic determinants of populist coalitions” (Jansen 2011, 79). The second generation of 
populism scholarship argued that populism was not a part of social structure but was rather a 
discourse (Alexander 1973, Hawkins 2009, Laclau 2005, Wolfe 1994). This scholarship 
“focused on the production and receptions- and most of all the content- of the personalities, 
propaganda, and speeches of populist leaders” (Jansen 2011, 80). Other scholars of this 
generation examined the reasons followers of populists supported the populist leaders (Auyero 
1999, Spalding 1977). This scholarship “painted a picture of populist movements as empowered, 
agentic, rational, and as a force for change- rather than as irrational and conservative” (Jansen 
2011, 80). 
The third and current generation of populist scholarship focuses on populism as a 
political phenomenon and neopopulism, which is when populism is used to enact neoliberal 
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policies (Huntington 1991, Jansen 2011, Moffitt 2016, Roberts 1996, Weyland 2001). Some 
third-generation scholars argue that populism occurs when people are not firmly incorporated 
into the political life of a nation (Jansen 2011, 81). The third generation has mainly focused on 
populism as a political style or rhetoric and has tended to focus more on populist leaders than the 
specific movements individual populists inspire as a whole.    
There has been a negative perception of populism as a phenomenon through all three 
generations of political science populism scholarship. Di Tella, an early populism scholar, noted 
that “populism smacks of improvisation and irresponsibility, and by its nature is not regarded as 
functional or efficient” (Di Tella 1965, 47). The main complaints scholars have had about 
populism as a phenomenon is that it is demagogic and irresponsible. The term is often used to 
describe opportunistic policies that are often short-term fixes rather than long-term solutions 
(Mudde 2004, 542). This negativity extends outside academic circles to the mainstream media 
and non-populist politicians as well. Roberts notes that the term “populism” is “typically hurled 
as a catch-all epithet designed to demean or discredit political forces viewed as demagogic, anti-
democratic, or politically irresponsible in their disruptive appeals to the basest instincts in a mass 
body politics” (Roberts 2016, 69). It is impossible to discuss populism without noting the disdain 
held towards it by political scientists, the mainstream media, and non-populist politicians.  
It is also important to note the regionalism of populism scholarship. Latin America is a 
more fertile ground for populism, as “European political systems are mostly parliamentary 
regimes that center on more or less well-organized political parties, while Latin American 
political systems are predominantly presidential, centered on strong individual leaders” (Mudde 
2004, 156). Mudde divides populists into two categories, inclusionary populists and exclusionary 
populists. Exclusionary populists exclude certain minority groups from their conceptions of “the 
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people,” while inclusionary populists include these groups. Populism in Latin America tends to 
be more inclusionary, while populism in Europe tends to be more exclusionary. As the United 
States is more similar socially and economically to Europe, the populism that occurs in the 
United States is more similar to the populism that occurs in the Europe, although the presidential 
system provides a more fertile ground for populism in the United States than in Europe.  
        There are four main perspectives on populism among political scientists: the historical 
perspective, economic perspective, ideological perspective, and political perspective. The 
historical perspective contends that populism exists when certain sociopolitical conditions that 
typically arise during the early stages of industrialization are present (Roberts 1995). The 
economic perspective “reduces populism to fiscal indiscipline and a set of expansionist or 
redistributive policies adopted in response to pressures of mass consumption” (Roberts 1995, 
84). The economic and historical perspectives are similar because they contend that populism 
arises under certain conditions. The ideological perspective contends that populism is a way of 
seeing the world as one where “the people” and powerful elites are in constant conflict. The 
political perspective “equates populism with a pattern of top-down mobilization by personalist 
leaders that bypasses institutional forms of political mediation” (Roberts 1995, 85). These four 
perspectives are the ways scholars discuss populism. 
Contemporary political scientists have focused on the ideological and political 
perspectives of populism. The scholars of the second and third generation have moved away 
from the historical perspective. Roberts notes that recent works “have argued persuasively that 
populism is a recurring phenomenon, rather than a period-specific historical anomaly” (Roberts 
1995, 83). Similarly, political scientists have moved away from the economic perspective. As 
noted by Weyland, “economic conceptualizations of populism are strikingly at odds with most 
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contemporary theorizing on the subject by political scientists and sociologists” (Weyland 2001, 
69).  
 
The Ideological and Performative Perspectives of Populism 
For the reasons described above, I focus on the ideological and political perspective of 
populism. Roberts presents an ideological definition, contending that populism is “a way of 
structuring the political field along an antagonistic divide between ‘the people’ however defined, 
and some kind of elite or political establishment, also however defined” (Roberts 2016, 70). His 
definition includes the basic starting point for all other definitions of populism: a dichotomy 
between the “the people” and “the elite.” Mudde offers a similar definition, defining populism as 
“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’,” and which argues that “politics 
should be an expression of the general will of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543). Mudde and 
Roberts offer simple, ideological definitions of populism.    
Who constitutes “the people” is extremely important to understanding populism. Mudde 
notes that “the people in the populist propaganda are neither real nor all-inclusive but are in fact 
a mythical and constructed subset of the whole population…. the people of the populists are an 
imagined community” (Mudde 2004, 546). The populist dichotomy of “the people” opposing 
“the elite” is a flexible framework, and populists choose how to define the two groups. Groups 
that are commonly included in the “elite” or “undeserving minority groups” are “domestic class 
or sectoral groups, political vested interests, the political establishment, intellectuals, foreign 
powers, foreign representatives, or foreign groups residing within the borders of a country” 
(Knight 1998, 230). Werner-Muller expands on this dichotomy, pointing out that more than 
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being critical of the elite is needed to be a populist- otherwise any politician running against the 
status quo could be considered a populist (Werner-Muller 2016, 61). She identifies the “tell-tale 
sign of populism” as the populist leader claiming “that they, and only they, represent the people” 
(Werner- Muller 2016, 62). These scholars emphasize the fact that the populist leader is able to 
set the bounds of who constitutes “the people,” making the ideological and discursive 
perspectives of populism flexible frameworks. 
Recently, “a growing number of authors have shifted their focus towards how populism is 
done- that is, how it is performed or enacted,” rather than seeing it as an ideology (Moffitt 2016, 
52). Among these scholars are those who have viewed populism not as a worldview but as a 
rhetoric, which can be used by those who have a populist worldview and those who do not 
(Gidron and Bonikowski 2016, Hawkins 2009, Poblete 2015, Stavrakais and Katsambekis 2014). 
The ideological definitions presented by Mudde and Roberts surface, but to these scholars 
populism is not an ideology but a language, used by speakers who attempt to use it to mobilize a 
group of people to act against ‘the elite,’ as defined by the individual speaker.  
Hawkins describes populism as a rhetoric, one which “sees populism as a Manichaean 
discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite” 
(Hawkins 2009, 1042). He argues that populist rhetoric is moral and dualistic, as it views the 
world as a place where a battle between good and evil rages (Hawkins 2009). Similarly, “the 
speech is heightened by ascribing cosmic proportions to them” (Hawkins 2009, 1063). The 
discourse is democratic, romanticizing the common man, and articulates that the evil is in a 
minority who was recently in charge and using the system to subvert the interests of the majority 
(Hawkins 2009, 1064). Hawkins’ definition of populism as a rhetoric goes into more depth than 
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Kazin’s more bare-boned definition and includes many of the common themes that continually 
surface in the works of “performative turn” scholars of populism.    
        Other scholars define populism as a political style (de la Torre 2010, Knight 2013, 
Mondon 2013, Moffitt 2016). Moffitt defines populism as “a political style that features an 
appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite,’ bad manners, and the performance of crisis, breakdown, 
or threat” (Moffitt 2016, 56). While the appeal to the “the people” versus “the elite” is the 
cornerstone of very definition of populism, Moffitt's inclusion of bad manners and the 
performance of crisis is unique to his definition. Knight also describes populism as a political 
style, which includes “a proclaimed rapport with ‘the people,’ a ‘them-and-us’ mentality, and a 
period of crisis and mobilization” (Knight 1998). Weyland defines populism as “a political 
strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on 
direct, unmediated, institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized 
followers” (Weyland 2001, 14). This definition implies that populism is more than just a rhetoric 
or a style; it is the basis on which populist leaders claim legitimacy.  
 Brubaker focuses on populism as both a rhetoric and style. After recognizing the 
people/elite dichotomy, he asserts that there are five core elements of populism. One of these 
elements is “antagonistic depoliticization,” which is “the claim to reassert democratic political 
control over domains of life that are seen as having been removed from the realm of democratic 
decision making” (Brubaker 2017, 364). The other elements are “majoritarianism,” “anti-
institutionalism,” “protectionism” as well as the style of populism, which Brubaker describes as 
including rhetorical “simplicity, directness, and seeming self-evidence, often accompanied by an 
explicitly anti-intellectualism” as well as a “willingness to break taboos and disrupt the 
conventions of polite speech and normal body language” (Brubaker 2017, 367). In creating his 
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definition, Brubaker focuses on both the rhetorical performance of a populist as well as their 
style more generally.   
        Jansen also views populism as a performance, offering a definition of populism that 
refers to it both as a discourse and as a mobilization. He advocates for viewing populism as “a 
mode of political practice- as a specific set of actions that politicians and their supporters do- 
rather than a type of movement party, regime, or ideology” (Jansen 2011, 82). He defines 
populism as a “sustained, large-scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized 
social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-
elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people” (Jansen 2011, 82). Jansen’s mobilization 
definition goes beyond the other political definitions to include the followers of a populist leader. 
While the scholars in this section differ in their views of exactly what populism is, they all view 
it as a political action rather than an ideology or part of history.  
 
Components of Populism 
 In the previous section, I outlined the main perspectives through which political scientists 
have viewed populism. Just as important to understanding the phenomenon is identifying the 
components of populism that political scientists have identified as being key to identifying 
political actors as populists. Some political scientists focus on populism as emanating from 
individual leaders (Mudde 2004, Weyland 2001), while others note that it can also be a 
grassroots movement (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010). Using the definitions presented in the 
previous section, I next identify components that political scientists have identified as being 
important to populism.  
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The dichotomy of “the people” and “the elite” is the core of all definitions of populism 
(Jansen 2011, Laclau 2005, Moffitt 2016, Mudde 2004, Roberts 2016, Roberts 1995, Werner-
Muller 2016, Weyland 2001). Roberts further notes that “the people” will always be moral, and 
“the elite” will always be corrupt (Roberts 2016, 70). Mudde also refers to “the people” as pure. 
(Mudde 2004, 543). Thus, to put it simply, populist rhetoric divides the populace into two 
categories: a pure, moral people and a corrupt elite. 
Beyond this cornerstone, populist leaders engage in several other rhetorical invocations. 
They often invoke the presence of a real or imagined conflict, as populism “gets its impetus from 
the perception of crisis, breakdown, or threat and at the same time aims to induce crisis through 
dramatization and performance” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Populists promise to rescue “the people” 
from threats and enemies (Weyland 2001, 14). They “claim to protect ‘the people’ from above, 
from below, and, today especially, from the outside” (Brubaker 2017, 366). This perception of a 
conflict is a predictor of support for populism among members of a population, as “surveys have 
shown that one’s personal socio-economic situation and support for right-wing populist parties 
often does not correlate at all, because the latter is based on a much more general assessment of 
the situation of one’s country” (Mudde 2004, 59).  
The crisis invoked is often a crisis of representation, related to the disconnect between 
citizens and their representatives (Moffitt 2013, 56). Laclau identified a crisis of representation 
in the political institutional domain as an essential precondition to populism (Laclau 2005).  
Populism “distrusts the mediating functions of institutions, especially political parties, media, 
and courts” (Brubaker 2017, 365). For this reason, populists often claim that “they, and only 
they, represent the people” (Werner-Muller 2016, 61). Thus, populist rhetoric invokes the 
presence of a real or imagined crisis, which is often a crisis of representation.  
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 As defined by political scientists, populists base their legitimacy on representing the will 
of the people which causes them to feel pressure to demonstrate this widespread popular support. 
He notes that “elections, plebiscites, mass demonstrations, and most recently opinion polls are 
the crucial instruments with which populist leaders mobilize and demonstrate their distinctive 
power capability” in order to “overpower their opponent’s institutional bastions” (Weyland 2001, 
12). Populists argue that “common sense” supports their positions when facts and figures do not. 
This appeal to common sense “often takes the form of the denial of expert knowledge” and is 
used as a weapon against “bureaucrats, technocrats, and representatives” (Moffitt 2016, 55). This 
appeal to the “common sense” of “the people” can also take the form of an attack on the 
“political correctness” of the elite (Moffitt 2016, 55). Mudde also notes that the “politically 
correct” are a group populists target (Mudde 2004, 561). Finally, right-wing populists in Europe 
and the United States often claim to be the voice of a ‘silent majority’” (Mudde 2004, 165). 
Thus, populist rhetoric invokes popularity as legitimacy, appeals to common sense, rails against 
political correctness and claims to represent a silent majority.   
 Right-wing populists in Europe and the United States “focus on protecting the conditions 
for a good life for ‘the people,’ which they consider increasingly threatened by outside forces 
(notably immigrants)” (Mudde 2004, 160). These foreigners can include groups “such as asylum 
seekers, migrant workers, or particular minority groups” and they are portrayed by populists as 
“as enemies of ‘the people’” (Moffitt 2016, 55). However, since immigrants are not part of the 
ruling elite, populists must find other ways to link foreigners to the elite (Moffitt 2016, 55). 
Populists often define “the people” in terms of race or immigration status, making populist 
rhetoric often racist or xenophobic.  
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Performative turn scholars of populism point to stylistic components as being important 
to the study of populism. Populists also set themselves apart from the established elite by having 
“bad manners.” By bad manners, Moffitt refers to “a coarsening of political rhetoric and a 
disregard for appropriate modes of acting in the political realm” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Moffitt gives 
examples of these bad manners, including “directness, playfulness, bullying, coarse language, a 
disregard for hierarchy and tradition, ready resort to anecdotes as evidence, and a studied 
ignorance of that which does not interest” the populist (Moffitt 2016, 55). Hawkins concurs, 
writing that populist speech “shows a bellicosity toward the opposition that is incendiary and 
condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent” (Hawkins 2009, 1064). 
Brubaker notes further that populists “break taboos, refuse euphemisms, and disrupt the 
conventions of polite speech and normal demeanor” (Brubaker 2017, 367). Bad manners are the 
core of the populist style.   
Coupled with these bad manners is an affinity for conspiracy theories. Right wing 
populists contend that the common people are disenfranchised because of an elite conspiracy 
(Mudde 2004, 166). When populists lose elections, they are more likely to question the election 
results, as they feel they “only lose if ‘the silent majority’ has not had a chance to speak, or, even 
worse, has been prevented from expressing itself” (Werner-Muller 2016, 61). Conspiracy 
theories assist populists in forming their “elite”/ “the people” worldview and their subsequent 
vilifying of “the elite.” This “frequent invocation of conspiracy theories by populists” is often 
articulated as “something going on behind the scenes has to account for the fact that corrupt 
elites are still keeping the people down” (Werner-Muller 2016, 61). 
There is a persistent anti-intellectualism that surfaces among populists. Populists display 
this anti-intellectualism when they “valorize common sense and first-hand experience over 
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abstract and experience-distant forms of knowledge” (Brubaker 2017, 367). Populist movements 
often “spurn intellectuals” (Knight 1998, 230). This anti-intellectualism surfaces in the rhetoric 
of populism through invocations of “common sense.” This appeal to common sense “often takes 
the form of the denial of expert knowledge” and is used as a weapon against “bureaucrats, 
technocrats, and representatives” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Populists also offer simple solutions to 
complex problems, which is part of their appeal (Mudde 2004, 542).  
Charismatic leadership and direct contact between the populist leader and their followers 
is another part of the populist style as identified by performative turn scholars. The populist style 
“implies a close bond between political leaders and the led” (Knight 1998, 226). Charismatic 
leadership is “common among populists” and is one of the “features (which) facilitates rather 
than defines populism” (Mudde 2004, 545). Weyland writes that populism occurs when “a 
charismatic leader wins broad, diffuse, yet intense support from a largely unorganized mass 
(Weyland 2001, 14). Mudde views direct communication, as another trait that is “common 
among populists” (Mudde 2004, 545). Populists “seek frequent face-to-face contacts with the 
masses, now often through television” (Weyland 2001, 14). This direct communication is 
specific to populism because “under populism the ruler is an individual, the connection between 
leaders and followers is based mostly on direct, quasi-personal communication, not an organized 
intermediation” (Weyland 2001, 13). Weyland argues that “to compensate for the fragility of 
their mass support, populist leaders seek to create a particularly intense connection to their 
followers” and that this connection is best created through direct contact (Weyland 2001, 13).   
 To understand populism, it is important to understand the definitions and components of 
populism as described above. While there is great debate among political scientists about what 
populism is, the two main schools of thought are those who view populism as an ideology and 
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those who view it as a performance. I use one of the political scientists in the first camp (Mudde) 
and one in the second camp (Moffitt) to examine Trump as a populist. In the next section, I write 
about the recent history of right-wing populism in America, which began with George Wallace 
and surfaced again with Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and the Tea Party. While America has 
also has a history of left-wing populism, stretching from the original Populists to the labor 
movement of the Gilded Age to the New Left of the 1960s (Kazin 1995), I am only concerned 
with right-wing populism in this paper. This examination of the history of right-wing populism 
in America will provide an idea of which groups Trump would be expected to include in his 
categorizations of “the people,” “the elite,” and the “undeserving minority groups.”  
 
A Brief History of Right-wing Populism in America   
 Populism has a long history in America, with the term first surfacing in regards to the 
People’s Party of the 1890s, a left-wing party comprised of farmers in the American West and 
South (Kazin 1995). Populism can refer to both liberals and conservatives, but this paper focuses 
on right-wing populism. Right-wing populism in contemporary America follows a framework 
first articulated by George Wallace during the 1960s (Kazin 1995, Lesher 1995). Wallace, the 
Governor of Alabama, is largely remembered for standing in the schoolhouse door at the 
University of Alabama in an attempt to block its integration. He ran three campaigns for 
President that were largely based around maintaining segregation, but which also relied on 
populist rhetoric and style in an attempt to win votes. Although Wallace was a conservative 
Democrat, it was the Republicans, beginning with Nixon and continuing until the present day, 
who have used “the rhetorical defense of hard working Americans against the liberal elite” 
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increasingly since 1968 (Kazin 1995, 247). Thus, George Wallace is the starting point for 
examining right-wing populism in America.  
 Wallace’s definition of the people was distinctly white and blue collar. He once named 
“his kind of people” as “the man in street- your steelworkers, your oil workers, building trades 
workers, beauticians, little businessmen, and farmers, and your policemen and firemen” (Kazin 
1995, 395). Wallace aimed to give voice to any citizen who was “harassed by arrogant but inept 
bureaucrats, slovenly and unpatriotic protesters, and criminal minorities- none of whom did 
anything useful for society” (Kazin 1995, 224). Wallace’s campaign was “driven by pure 
resentment, an ability to whip up the hostilities of certain average whites and channel them in his 
direction” (Kazin 1995, 239). To Wallace, the common white American was losing out in a 
system run by corrupt, liberal politicians who were favoring minorities and hippies over the 
common man.   
 Wallace specifically attacked “elite” mainstream politicians and bureaucrats by 
emphasizing states’ rights. His main targets on the national stage were “powerful judges, 
bureaucrats, and theoreticians” who wanted to impose “‘absurd’ blueprints for change on 
average men and women” (Kazin 1995, 234). The states’ rights Wallace was focused on was a 
state’s right to remain segregated, and the “absurd blueprints” he railed against were civil rights 
bills. One way Wallace opposed civil rights bills, specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was 
by invoking property rights. Opponents of the Civil Rights Act, including Wallace, argued that it 
“would dramatically restrict the right to exclude from private property” (Brophy 2016, Leshner 
1995). While subtler, this invocation of property rights was an important way Wallace opposed 
the politicians who were pushing for civil rights bills.   
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Wallace argued for segregation and against civil rights bills mainly by attacking federal 
encroachment.  He had “no tolerance for ‘the crowd above the Potomac River’ who try ‘to tell us 
how to go about it’” (Kazin 1995, 230). “A vote for this little governor,” he once remarked, “will 
let people in Washington know that we want them to leave our house, schools, jobs, businesses, 
and farms alone” (Leshner 1995, 284). He attacked the both parties, arguing that “there isn’t a 
dime’s worth of difference” between them, and that both were failing to represent the interests of 
white Americans (Kazin 1995, 240). The politicians, bureaucrats and judges of the federal 
government were “the elite” of Wallace’s populism.  
 The Wallace campaigns during the 1960s were built on the foundation of racial 
resentment and the contention that the politicians pushing civil rights were favoring -Americans 
over white Americans. During his earlier campaigns for Governor and his run for President in 
1964, he used overtly racist justifications for segregation. While travelling the country before his 
campaign in 1964, he described African-Americans as “easy going, basically happy, 
unambitious, and incapable of much learning” (Leshner 1995, 263). He praised “mulattos” for 
“inheriting the mentality and personality of their white ancestor” before saying that the same was 
not the case for their “less capable African half-brother” (Leshner 1995, 263).     
In 1968, however, Wallace largely shifted away from overt racism and spoke more in 
coded language. Avoiding overtly racist statements in public, Wallace instead argued that 
“segregation serves the best interest of all of our people” (Kazin 1995, 231). Wallace’s political 
strength resulted from the “anti-black feelings that he skillfully whipped up with the use of code 
phrases like ‘law and order’ and ‘neighborhood schools’” (Kazin 1995, 233). This use of coded 
language was noticed by observers of the 1968 campaign, one of whom wrote that Wallace 
“never mentions racism and, increasingly, has put his candidly segregationist views on the back 
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burner. Defending ‘property rights’ is just as effective and the message is just as clear” (Leshner 
1995, 413). Categorizing African-Americans as an undeserving minority group in a subtle way 
was crucially important in Wallace’s popularity among those uncomfortable with Wallace’s 
more blatantly racist past.  
 Wallace attacked those protesting the Vietnam war on college campuses and throughout 
the country in direct and indirect ways. He frequently verbally attacked hecklers at his rallies, 
and once warned “that protestors or hippies who dared lie down to block his car would learn it 
would be the last car they ever blocked” (Kazin 1995, 399). His attacks on anti-war protestors 
included often attacking those “guilty of treason” for “raising money and donating blood for the 
VietCong” (Leshner 1995, 392). Pro-police tough talk was common in Wallace’s rhetoric, 
including statements such as “Let the police run this country for a year or two and three and 
wouldn’t be any riots” (Kazin 1995, 236). During a time of unrest in the United States about the 
Vietnam War, Wallace tried to win votes by placing the “hippies” who were culturally different 
from the voters he sought into his categorization of “the elite.”  
 Wallace attacked the media as part of “the elite.” The media’s supposed communism was 
one of the lines of attack; Wallace reminded crowds at rallies that the New York Times had called 
Fidel Castro “the Robin Hood of the Caribbean”, when “every taxi driver in Montgomery knew 
he was a communist” (Kazin 1995, 236). He once said “the American people are sick and tired 
of columnists and TV dudes” who “try to slant and destroy and malign and brainwash the 
country” (Leshner 1995, 309). During his speeches Wallace did not attack the individual 
reporters who were attending his rallies, who he described as “hardworking reporters,” and 
instead focused his anger on “the editors, back in offices, that write all that stuff” (Kazin 1995, 
240). Finally, Wallace and his close associates would pack rooms used for press conferences “in 
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advance with supporters who disrupted the conferences by booing reporters’ questions and 
cheering Wallace’s answers” (Carlson 1981, 35).  
Wallace also argued that intellectuals were a part of the “elite”.  One of Wallace’s go-to 
applause lines at his rallies was about a professor who “knows how to run the Vietnam War but 
can’t park his bicycle straight” (Kazin 1995, 236). He often “urged his audience to laugh at the 
ineptness and impracticality of liberal intellectuals” (Kazin 1995, 236). He also threatened to 
“seek an indictment against any college professor who calls for a communist victory in 
Vietnam...that’s not free speech, that’s treason” (Leshner 1995, 421). Wallace used clueless 
professors to draw a contrast with his followers, whom he portrayed as having the wisdom of 
common sense.  
 The strand of right-wing populism that Wallace created began being echoed by 
Republicans during the very election that Wallace was running in. During the 1968 campaign, 
Richard Nixon “espoused more and more of Wallace’s core campaign,” speaking out on the 
issues of “crime, school busing, federal enforcement of school desegregation, antiwar activists 
and the federal judiciary (Leshner 1995, 403). Further, Nixon hoped “to co-opt” Wallace’s effort 
by “portraying himself in the South as a more electable version of Wallace” (Kalk 1994, 87). 
“The people” in Nixon’s imagination consisted of “labor leaders and people from middle 
America who still have character and guts and a bit of patriotism” (Kazin 1995, 249). This 
concept of “Middle America” invoked “a feeling of being squeezed between penthouse and 
ghetto- between a condescending elite above and scruffy demonstrators and welfare recipients 
below” (Kazin 1995, 153). Along with the phrase “Middle America,” Nixon also popularized the 
term “silent majority,” which implied that Nixon had the support of “the people.”         
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 Nixon also spoke out against protesters, once saying the government should meet “force 
with force” when it came to protestors and provide “retaliation against the perpetrators and 
planners of violence” (Leshner 403). Nixon also catered to White America through his Southern 
Strategy. Nixon’s Southern strategy consisted of promising segregationist leaders he would “stop 
accelerating federal commitment to racial integration” as well as using coded language such as 
“law and order,” just as Wallace had (Kalk 1994, 88). During the 1968 campaign, Nixon argued 
that the federal government was “going too far” in the pursuit of school integration in the South 
(Leshner 403). This catering to White America at the expense of African-Americans, while much 
less blatant that Wallace’s racism, was a way to categorize African-Americans as part of an 
undeserving minority group.  
 The largest development to right-wing populism during the Nixon years was the ferocity 
with which Nixon and his administration attacked the media. While Presidents have always 
criticized the press for treating them unfairly, Nixon’s administration popularized the term 
“media,” “believing it had a colder, more sinister sound than the traditional ‘press’” and offered 
“the media” as a “new type of elite” (Kazin 1995, 252).  Pat Buchanan, then a speechwriter for 
the Nixon administration, stated that “there is no element in American life more out of touch 
with the concerns and beliefs of the common man than the liberal press” (Kazin 1995, 252). 
Members of Nixon’s administration were the first to attack the “liberal media” in a serious way.    
Ronald Reagan also relied on the rhetoric of populism to a great degree (Kazin 1995). He 
claimed to represent “the people” as opposed to the Democrats, who “used to fight for the 
working families of America, but now only seem to fight for the special interests” (Kazin 1995, 
262). Statements like this made it seem like “a bundle of privileged minorities were the problem- 
organized feminists, homosexuals, advocates of affirmative action, public schools, and 
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government unions,” though Reagan rarely attacked these groups by name (Kazin 1995, 262). 
Reagan’s rhetoric separating “the people” from “the special interests” is inherently populist. 
Reagan’s populism also included the Wallace groups. His argument about cutting back 
the welfare state rested on the assumption that “elite interests and the black poor were colluding 
in parasitic embrace” (Kazin 1995, 263). Also included in the Reaganite script of populist 
rhetoric were “federal bureaucrats, the mass media, and arrogant academics” (Kazin 1995, 266). 
He attacked protesters as well, saying in his 1968 campaign that they were “rabble rousers and 
hate-mongers, members of the New Left who are really unwashed members of the old right 
practicing storm trooper tactics” (Leshner 1995, 407).   
 However, the comparisons among Wallace and Nixon and Reagan are not perfect and 
classifying Nixon and Reagan as populists is problematic. Nixon, a Republican politician who 
had served in Congress and as Vice President, did not attack “politicians” and the political 
parties in the same way that Wallace did. Nixon and Reagan’s comments on race were nowhere 
near as inflammatory as Wallace’s. The largest difference between these politicians was their 
political style. Wallace was a charismatic speaker, who endeared himself to “the people” through 
his bad manners, while Nixon was much more reserved man who, for the most part, followed the 
mainstream rules that governed the behaviors of politicians during the time. Reagan also did not 
display the bad manners that are an important part of the populist style. While most scholars of 
right-wing populism would apply the title of “populist” to Wallace, fewer would be inclined to 
apply it to Reagan and Nixon because of these stylistic differences. 
 Conservatives following the “Reagan Revolution” continued to mimic his populist 
rhetoric. While George H.W Bush was often criticized for his “inability to speak the language of 
populism,” other conservatives at the time used populist rhetoric, such as Pat Buchanan, who 
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“ran a campaign ‘aimed at Main Street as opposed to Wall Street’” (Brewer 2016, 250, Kazin 
1995, 270). Newt Gingrich and the “Contract with America” Republicans “knew how vital 
(populist anger) was to infusing their antigovernment cause with moral legitimacy (Kazin 1995, 
275). George W. Bush portrayed himself as “a simple man who shared the values and 
perspectives of the common people rather than those of Washington,” and “was often described 
as adopting a somewhat populist persona” (Brewer 2016, 250, Perry 2014, 101). Finally, Sarah 
Palin used populist rhetoric, complaining about “so-called academic and cultural elite” as well as 
“the Left, who is ashamed of saying that America is good” (Larson and Porpora 2011, 769). 
Stretching from Reagan to the Tea Party was a line of conservatives who knew how to 
successfully craft arguments that were populist in nature.  
 Rasmussen and Schoen argue that the Tea Party was populist, attributing its rise to “an 
unprecedented crisis of confidence” in American “economic, political and social systems,” 
because of income inequality, economic dislocation and globalization (Rasmussen and Schoen 
2010, 53). Tea Party supporters believed that “the economic system works only for the elite” and 
that “the political elite are becoming detached from the nation at large” (Rasmussen and Schoen 
2010, 55). In the Tea Party’s imagination, “the people” who are being hurt by the elites and the 
undeserving minority groups that the elites favor are “ordinary people,” who “have always 
believed that if they worked hard and paid their taxes things would work out in the end and they 
would get ahead” (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, 95). This is not a reality for these “ordinary 
people” anymore, and they respond by blaming political, economic and cultural elites 
(Rasmussen and Schoen 2010).  
 The “undeserving minority groups” in Tea Party populism were similar to the groups 
Wallace first attacked. Tea Party supporters wanted to get rid of entitlements they believe go to 
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undeserving African-Americans and immigrants (Edsall 2012, 58). Another major issue to 
members of the Tea Party was immigration: 83 percent of Tea Party supporters saw immigration 
as a serious problem, significantly more than any other group (Sustar 2013, 60). Tea Party 
supporters were also anti-government, and many “Tea Party candidates,” conservative 
Republicans who vowed to “shake things up” in Washington were elected to the House of 
Representatives in 2010 (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010). The Tea Party showed the appeal of 
right-wing populism in the years preceding the 2016 campaign.  
Since populists tell voters that the “elites are out of touch with ordinary people, trampling 
on their interests and usurping resources for themselves and undeserving minorities groups,” 
understanding who is included in each of a populist’s categorizations is key to understanding the 
populist’s greater electoral strategy (Cramer 201, 86). The categorization in Table 1.1 below 
shows the groups that have been a part of the conceptualizations of right-wing populists in 
America.   
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Table 1.1: Elites and Undeserving Minority Groups in Right-Wing Populism  
Elite and Undeserving Minority Group As Categorized By These Presidents/ Groups 
Politicians/ bureaucrats Wallace, Reagan, Tea Party  
Both Political Parties Wallace, Tea Party  
Media Wallace, Nixon, Reagan, Tea Party 
African-Americans Wallace, Nixon, Reagan, Tea Party  
Protestors Wallace, Nixon, Reagan 
Intellectuals Wallace 
Immigrants Tea Party 
   
Politicians and political parties in our democracy win elections by building coalitions 
through courting active groups (Dahl 1956, Bishin 2000). Understanding which groups Donald 
Trump defined as “the people,” “the elites,” and the “undeserving minority groups” is vitally 
important to how he used the language of populism, and to understanding which groups may be 
included in the rhetoric of conservative populism in America in the coming years. Right-wing 
populists in America have traditionally been exclusionary, attacking minority groups as “other,” 
which is problematic, as minority rights is a cornerstone of our constitutional system. 
Furthermore, the groups traditionally targeted by right-wing populists are groups that are already 
vulnerable and become further maligned as the result of being the target of right-wing populists. 
These attacks on weaker groups in society go against the Western values of openness, tolerance, 
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and diversity. In the next section, I present how I will structure my inquiry of the populism of 
Donald Trump, focused on two competing definitions of populism.  
 
What Moffit and Mudde Have in Common 
 In my inquiry of Trump as populist, I will be focusing on two theories: Moffitt’s political 
style approach and Mudde’s theory of populism as outlined in his work, “The Populist Zeitgeist.” 
Both political scientists suggest a transnational phenomenon while noting that populism can and 
does occur in North America. I chose these specific definitions because the ideological and 
performative perspectives of populism are the two major contemporary competing perspectives 
on populism. Moffitt’s political style approach will allow me to examine how Trump fits in 
which the scholarship of those who view populism as a performance. Mudde’s ideological 
approach allows me to examine how Trump fits into the scholarship of political scientists who 
view populism as an ideology.  
 First, there are some components of Moffitt and Mudde’s definitions that overlap. The 
dichotomy of “the people” and “the elite” is the core of all definitions of populism, including 
Moffitt and Mudde’s (Moffitt 2016, Mudde 2004). Moffitt and Mudde also both note that “the 
people” in the populist imagination are wise, and that populist leaders appeal to “common sense” 
as the basis of good policy making. Moffitt writes that “the people” are “presented as the true 
holders of sovereignty” by the populist, who often champion “common sense” (Moffitt 2016, 
55). Mudde writes that for populists “the consciousness of the people, referred to as common 
sense, is the basis of all good politics (Mudde 20014, 547).  
Moffitt and Mudde both argue that populists point to a crisis of representation, as the 
impetus of their arrival on the political scene. Populism “gets its impetus from the perception of 
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crisis, breakdown, or threat and at the same time aims to induce crisis through dramatization and 
performance” (Moffitt 2016, 55). This perception of a conflict is a predictor of support for 
populism among members of a population, as support for right-wing populist parties is correlated 
with a negative assessment of the situation of one’s country (Mudde 2004, 59). The crisis 
invoked is often a crisis of representation, related to the disconnect between citizens and their 
representatives (Moffitt 2013, 56). Mudde writes that populists argue that political parties 
“corrupt the link between leaders and supporters, create artificial divisions within the 
homogeneous people, and put their own interests above those of the people” (Mudde 2004, 546).  
Finally, both Moffitt and Mudde agree that populists allow no room for negotiation, 
deliberation, and compromise. Mudde writes that because populists view “the elite” as evil, 
“compromise is impossible, as it ‘corrupts’ the purity” of the populist leader and “the people” 
(Mudde 2004, 544). Moffitt contends that populists favor “short-term and swift action rather than 
the ‘slow politics of negotiation and deliberation” (Moffitt 2016, 56). Furthermore, “that which 
gets in the way of addressing the issue or the crisis has to be ignored, supplanted or removed” 
(Moffitt 2016, 56). In conclusion, both political scientists argue that the “the people” vs. “the 
elite” dichotomy, the belief that the consciousness of the people is the basis of good governance, 
an appeal to “common sense,” the presence of a crisis and anti-party sentiment, and that 
populists do not believe in negotiation, deliberation and compromise are components of 
populism.             
   
Components Specific to Moffit 
 Despite having some components in common, Moffitt's political style approach differs 
from Mudde’s ideological approach in several ways. Moffitt notes that populists “may also target 
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others- such as asylum seekers, immigrant workers, or particular minority groups” as “enemies 
of the people” and that these “others” will be linked to “the elite” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Populists 
often accuse “the elite” as unfairly favoring these undeserving minority groups at the expense of 
“the people.” These others are often “asylum seekers, immigrant workers, or particular minority 
groups” (Moffitt 2016, 55). This inclusion of “others” being tied to “the elite” is unique to 
Moffitt’s definition. 
In Moffitt’s definition, populists are opposed to political correctness, bureaucrats and 
technocrats, and must prove their outsider status. Moffitt writes that populists “include claims 
against the ‘political correctness’ of ‘the elite,’” which they invoke to “prove their outsider 
status” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Populists deny “expert knowledge” and promote the use of “common 
sense” at the expense of “bureaucrats, technocrats, representatives, or ‘guardians of our interests” 
(Moffitt 2016, 55). This distrust of experts and opposition to political correctness are 
demonstrated by populists in order to prove their outsider status in Moffitt’s definition.    
The most significant part of Moffitt’s definition is the inclusion of bad manners as being 
critical identifying populists. These bad manners include “a coarsening of political rhetoric and a 
disregard for ‘appropriate’ modes of acting in the political realm” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Elements 
of this “low” style of political actions include “the use of slang, swearing, political incorrectness, 
and being overly demonstrative and ‘colorful’” as well as bullying, bad language and a disregard 
for institutions and norms (Moffitt 2016, 55). These bad manners are at the center of Moffitt’s 
political style definition of populism.  
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Components Specific to Mudde 
 Mudde’s definition of populism as an ideology includes several components that are not 
in Moffitt’s political style definition. Mudde writes that to populists, “there are only friends and 
foes,” leading them to believe that “opponents are not just people with different priorities and 
values, they are evil!” (Mudde 2004, 544). Moffitt touches on the enemies populists make, but 
does not contend that populists believe that their enemies are evil. Mudde also goes further than 
Moffitt on the topic of anti-party sentiment, writing that populists “oppose the established 
parties” and “call for, or claim to be, a new kind of party” (Mudde 2004, 546). While Moffitt 
contends that populists argued that the current “establishment politicians” are hurting “the 
people,” Mudde argues that populists create new political parties. 
Finally, Mudde differs from Moffitt in contending that populists are not necessarily 
against expert opinions and are not necessarily outsiders. He writes that “populism is not 
necessarily opposed to technocratic measures,” and that “this trust in ‘experts’ and the 
simultaneous distrust of politicians, can be found in the ideas of contemporary populists” 
(Mudde 2004, 547). Mudde also contends that “the populist leader is not necessarily a true 
outsider,” and that some populists can be described as “outsider-elites: connected to the elites, 
but not a part of them” (Mudde 2004, 560). These two claims, that populists are not necessarily 
opposed to expert opinions and are not necessarily outsiders, differentiate Mudde’s populism as 
an ideology theory and Moffitt’s political style theory. 
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Table 1.2: Moffitt and Mudde Components of Populism      
     Component of Populism                    Scholar                                    Specific Example 
“The People” vs “The Elite” Both Moffitt and Mudde “The people” “the elite” 
Common Sense Both Moffitt and Mudde “Common sense,” “the people 
know better” 
Crisis of Representation Both Moffitt and Mudde “Politicians have failed you” 
No negotiation, deliberation, 
compromise 
Both Moffitt and Mudde “Enough talk, we need 
action” 
Populists target “Others” Moffitt “(Minority group) are 
criminals” 
Anti- “Political Correctness” Moffitt “Political correctness is bad” 
Opposed to Bureaucrats, 
Technocrats and Experts 
Moffitt “We have the worst people 
telling our leaders what to do” 
Bad Manners Moffitt Slang, swearing, anecdotes as 
evidence 
Opponents are evil Mudde “Morally corrupt” “Evil” 
Call for new party Mudde “Run as independent” “Both 
parties are bad” 
Can Support Experts Mudde “Scientists say” “Economists 
say” 
Connected to Elites Mudde “I am wealthy and know all 
the politicians” 
 
 I use the above components of populism in order to examine whether Trump acts in the 
way a populist is expected to and to see whether he fits into either Moffitt or Mudde’s definition 
better than the other. Outlining the components of populism and clarifying the differences 
between Moffitt and Mudde, as I did in the above section, makes this an either task. In the next 
section, I outline the methodology of how I examined Trump as a populist. I outline what 
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specific language I was listening for in the campaign speeches I listened to and how this 
language fulfills each of the above components.  
  
Methodology  
I listened to thirty-six Trump campaign speeches, two speeches per month from every 
month of the Trump campaign, from June 2015 to November 2016. The first speech I listened to 
was his campaign announcement speech on June 16, 2015 and the last speech was his victory 
speech, given in the early hours of November 9, 2016. Listening to thirty-six speeches allowed 
me to examine a breadth of content from throughout the time Trump was a candidate. I found 
these speeches on YouTube (see Appendix for a list of links to these speeches). I recorded how 
Trump invokes the components of populism as identified by Mudde in Moffitt and outlined in 
Table 1.2 and noted the times he acted in differently than what would be expected of a populist.  
I also examined which groups Donald Trump includes in his categorization of “the elite” and 
“undeserving minority groups” (Table 1.1). I created a spreadsheet to collect this data. This 
research design allows me to examine if and how Trump fits into both Moffitt and Mudde’s 
definitions of populism, as well as taking a look at the groups that comprise “the elite” and 
“others” in Trump’s populist imagination. 
In a content analysis, it is important to be clear about what keywords were listened for 
and how the content was coded. A more through explanation of my content analysis is in order. 
Specifically, I counted any direct mention of the term “the people” or “people” in the category 
“The People.” An example of when Trump would say “people” instead of “the people” (without 
the meaning changing) comes from his campaign announcement speech, when he told a crowd 
that “people are saying ‘what’s going on? I just want a job” (6/16/15).  Both Mudde and Werner-
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Muller note that populists can use the term “silent majority” to refer to “the people,” so I coded 
mentions of the “silent majority” under the “The People” category (Mudde 2004, Werner-Muller 
2016). Finally, I also coded anytime Trump contrasted his crowd with “the elite” as an 
invocation of “the people,” such as when he told a crowd “you are my bosses, not the lobbyists, 
not the special interests, and not the donors” (12/5/15).    
Along with coding direct mentions of “the elite” in the “The Elite” category, I also coded 
the times Trump attacked the groups that made up his elite, namely politicians, the media, special 
interests, donors, lobbyists, PACs, hedge funds, big business, and Wall Street. Similarly, 
included in the “Other” category the times Trump attacked the groups that made up the 
“undeserving minority groups” in Trumpian populism, namely Muslims, immigrants, refugees, 
Black Lives Matter, and protestors. The coding for the “Common Sense” and “Anti-Political 
Correctness” categories was also straightforward, as I only coded times Trump directly used 
those phrases under those categories.    
Under the “Crisis of Representation” category, I coded the times that Trump attacked 
politicians and America’s leaders more generally, as well as the times he mentioned that 
America was an international laughingstock. I also included times that Trump accused donors, 
special interests, and lobbyists of controlling America’s political system, as well as complaints 
about “the system” generally. Under the “No negotiation, deliberation, compromise” category, I 
included the times Trump complained of “all talk, no action politicians” and when he 
complained about how all politicians do is talk without using that phrase directly. Interestingly, 
Trump made many statements that demonstrated an openness to negotiation and compromise, 
which is exactly the opposite of what both Moffitt and Mudde would expect of a populist. Under 
the “Open to negotiation, deliberation, compromise” section, I listened for and coded the times 
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that Trump mentioned his skill in negotiation (usually through bragging about The Art of the 
Deal), complained about the inability of America’s leaders to negotiate good deals, and 
mentioned the fact that he knew people who were good negotiators.   
A difficult category to code was the “Bad Manners” category. According to Moffitt, the 
bad manners that a populist exhibits include “directness, playfulness, bullying, coarse language, 
a disregard for hierarchy and tradition, ready resort to anecdotes as evidence, and a studied 
ignorance of that which does not interest” (Moffitt 2016, 55). However, it is very difficult to 
measure directness, playfulness, and a disregard for hierarchy and tradition. For the category of 
bad manners, I counted the Trump statements that include swearing, using anecdotes as 
evidence, making fun of the injured, spreading conspiracy theories, giving out the personal 
phone number of an opponent, doing impressions of foreigners, advocating violence, name-
calling, alluding to the size of his genitalia, and by showing an ignorance of that which did not 
interest him. 
Under the “Opposed to Bureaucrats/Technocrats/Experts” category, I included times 
Trump mentioned being opposed to specific bureaucratic and expert groups, such as economists, 
the VA, polling companies, and political aides.  Most of the entries under this category are times 
Trump mentioned an opposition to common core by saying that children should be educated 
locally, instead of by “bureaucrats in Washington.”  While Trump attacked his opponents many, 
many times in the speeches in this study, I only included an attack in the “Evil Opponents” 
category when it made a moral judgement on the person, such as when he said “the press are 
terrible people” (7/11/15). Trump also made several statements identifying his opponents as not 
evil, which is another way he did not behave as Mudde would expect a populist to. I coded a 
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statement as a part of the “Identifying opponents as not evil” category when he recognized an 
opponent as a “good guy,” a “nice person,” or used similar verbiage.   
The final categories are the “New Party” category, the “Support Republican Party” 
category and the “Connected to Elite” category. I included statements in which Trump criticized 
Republicans as a part of the “New Party” category, as well statements in which Trump linked the 
two parties as being the same. In the “Support Republican Party” category, I included statements 
in which Trump praised the Republican party or the Republican National Committee, a final way 
in which he broke with what Mudde would expect of a populist. Finally, in the “Connected to the 
Elite” category I included statements in which Trump bragged about how rich he was, said that 
knew the system better than anyone else, and mentioned celebrities he knew.     
 
Results 
Populist Components 
 From the thirty-six speeches I listened to, I observed 1487 statements from Trump that fit 
into the populist categories as identified by Mudde and Moffitt. The components most evident 
were that Trump referred to “the people,” 104 times over the course of the speeches, attacked the 
groups he designated as “elite” 882 times, invoked a crisis of representation 457 times, called out 
“others” 188 times, demonstrated bad manners 117 times, and made statements that connected 
himself to the elites 110 times. The full results appear in the Table 1.3. Included in bold are the 
results for the times in which Trump made statements that would contradict what would be 
expected of a populist based on the components as identified by Moffitt and Mudde.     
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Table 1.3: Trump’s Use of the Components of Populism 
“The People” 104 
“The Elite” 882 
Common Sense 12 
Crisis of Representation 457 
No negotiation, deliberation, compromise 82 
Open to negotiation, deliberation, compromise 25 
Populists target “Others” 188 
Anti- “Political Correctness” 18 
Opposed to Bureaucrats, Technocrats and Experts 28 
Bad Manners 117 
Evil Opponents 29 
Identifying opponents as not evil 33 
New Party 23 
Support Republican Party 4 
Supports Experts  2 
Connected to Elite 110 
 
Groups 
 During the 36 speeches, Trump made 1070 statements attacking groups that he argued 
opposed him, and by extension, the people. The two main groups that Trump attacked were 
politicians (450 times) and the media (226 times). Other groups that were often mentioned 
negatively were undocumented immigrants (78), special interests (57), donors (78), and lobbyists 
(36). Complete results are shown in Table 1.4.    
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Table 1.4: “Elite” and “Other” Groups in Trumpian populism 
Politicians 450 
The Media 226 
Muslims 33 
Immigrants 78 
Refugees 33 
Black Lives Matter 28 
Special Interests 57 
Donors 78 
Lobbyists 36 
PACs 8 
Hedge Funds 8 
Protestors 17 
Big Business/Wall Street 7 
 
Change over Time 
 Interestingly, the mentions of direct invocations of “the elite” and “the people” increased 
drastically starting with the Republican Convention in July 2016. Before the convention, Trump 
would speak without a teleprompter, and seemed to almost randomly choose from a collection of 
topics he cared about, changing from speech to speech. Starting with the convention and 
continuing through the general election, however, Trump’s campaign became more 
conventional, with him reading speeches off a teleprompter. Trump’s earlier speeches, delivered 
without the use of a teleprompter, were rambling and unscripted, showing that they were coming 
directly from Trump. On the other hand, the later speeches, read from teleprompters, were more 
likely a collaboration between Trump and campaign speech writers, such as Stephan Bannon, 
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who joined the campaign around the time of the Republican convention, and Steve Miller, who 
wrote the speech Trump gave at the Republican convention. These later speeches contained 
significantly more direct mentions of “the people” and “the elite.”  
 In the 27 speeches from his campaign announcement to the speech I coded from early 
July 2016, Trump mentioned “the people” 42 times (or 1.55 times per speech); in the nine 
speeches starting with the convention, Trump mentioned “the people” 62 times (6.8 times). This 
drastic change points to the fact that at least on the topic of directly speaking of “the people,” 
Trump’s populist rhetoric resulted from the professionalization of his campaign and from the 
minds of speechwriters such as Steven Miller and Steve Bannon, instead of from his own 
imagination.  
 
Discussion 
Components Shared by Moffitt and Mudde 
 “The People”  
 Donald Trump mentioned “the people” 104 times over the course of the 36 speeches and 
contrasted “the people” with “the elite” 43 times. At the beginning of his campaign, this took the 
form of references of “the silent majority.” In a speech in July 2015, Trump mentioned a silent 
majority that wanted “to go out, they want to have a good life, they want to work hard, they want 
to have a family, they don’t want to go to rallies” (7/11/15).  In August, he referred to himself as 
a member of the silent majority and said that “we’re tired of being pushed around and being led 
by stupid people” (8/17/15). Trump often echoed this idea, that “the people in this country are 
tired of being taken advantage of” (10/29/15). As the summer of 2015 turned to fall, Trump 
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would invoke the “silent majority” as attending his rallies, arguing that “they used to call us the 
silent majority, it’s not silent anymore, and it is a majority” (10/10/15). 
A main theme of Trump’s rhetoric was that he, unlike his opponents, was not a traditional 
politician and not controlled by lobbyists, donors, and special interests. He contrasted himself 
with his opponents, saying that “you (the people) are my bosses, not the lobbyists, not the special 
interests, not the donors” (12/5/18). He referred to himself as “owing these people (the crowd), 
not them (lobbyists, special interests, donors)” (12/21/15). He painted himself as the 
representative of the people, saying that as President he would be “Donald Trump, representing 
all of us” (2/19/16) and that “with me, I’m representing you. Just you (not special interests and 
lobbyists” (6/2/16).  He often touted his connection with the people, noting that “I have a ton of 
people who want to endorse but want to meet with me, get dinner first...I don’t want to be with 
them, I want to be with you” (2/29/16).  
As noted previously, Trump’s use of rhetoric invoking “the people” and “the elite” 
drastically increased beginning with his convention speech in July of 2016 and continued 
throughout the rest of his campaign. During this time, he read speeches from the teleprompter, 
allowing him to stay “on message” to a greater degree and read the words of speeches written 
with help from populist campaign staffers. The convention speech, written by Stephen Miller, 
includes the most mentions of “the people” of any of the 36 speeches, with 17 (Hackman 2016). 
In this speech, Trump remarks that “the American people will come first again” and that “every 
day I wake up determined to deliver a better life for the people all across this nation that have 
been ignored, neglected and abandoned” (7/21/16). Trump tells the people that “I am your voice. 
I am with you, I will fight for you, and I will win for you” (7/21/16). Near the end of Trump’s 
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speech, he tells the American people that “I am asking to be your champion in the White House. 
My pledge reads, I’m with you, the American people” (7/21/16).  
During the last few months of the campaign, Trump used rhetoric similar to that which he 
used at the Republican convention.  He continued to argue that he was “fighting for all of us” 
and pointed to the words of Lincoln, arguing that “the media, donor, political complex that’s bled 
this country dry for many years needs to be replaced by a new government, of, for, and by the 
people” (8/21/16).  He contended that he will “deliver for you, the American people” and that 
“this will finally be the year that the American people say enough is enough” (9/16/16, 
10/12/16). Finally, Trump wrapped up his campaign on November 7, 2016, by arguing that his 
campaign was “fighting for every citizen who believes government should serve the people, not 
the donors, and not the special interests” (11/7/16). Trump often invoked “the people” during his 
campaign speeches, especially after the Republican Convention. 
 
“The Elite” 
The elite that Trump was fighting against included politicians, the media, special 
interests, lobbyists, and donors, hedge fund managers, and business elites. These groups were 
often contrasted with “the people” for whom Trump and his campaign argued. Early on in his 
campaign, however, Trump misunderstood the term from a populist’s perspective. In April 2016, 
Trump compared himself to Washington elites, stating that “they talk about elites in 
Washington...do you think they have a better plane than I do?” before stating “like hell they’re 
elites, these are people who don’t have a clue” (4/27/16). In a later speech he said “These 
eggheads that you watch on television...I have a nicer plane than they do, they’re not elite” 
(5/2/16). He followed up that claim by saying “we’re elite folks, we’re elite” (5/2/16). These 
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attempts to use the term “elite” as a positive and to describe himself and his crowd as “elite” 
show a misunderstanding of the term from a populist’s perspective: instead of attacking 
opponents as elite, early on in his campaign Trump used “elite” as a compliment and tried to co-
opt the term to fit himself and his crowd.   
Trump’s use of the term “elite” fits better into the traditional populist mold starting with 
his convention speech. He outlines his view of an elite compromised of “big business, elite 
media, and major donors” who are “lining up behind the campaign of my opponent because they 
know she will keep the rigged system in place” (7/21/16). This elite group is “throwing money at 
her because they have control over every single thing she does. She is their puppet, and they pull 
the strings” (7/21/16). During the speech, Trump announces that he had “joined the political 
arena so the powerful can no longer beat up on people who cannot defend themselves” (7/21/16). 
This rhetoric that began at the convention continued into the fall, as Trump told crowds that his 
campaign was “going to take government away from the special interests...and give it back to the 
voters” (8/21/16).  He promises a government “that serves you and your country, not the special 
interests, the donors, and the lobbyists” (8/21/16). As the campaign drew to a close, Trump 
promised that “the media, donor, political complex that’s bled this country dry for many years” 
would be replaced should he win (8/21/16). In Trump’s populist imagination, “the elite” was 
comprised of politicians, the media, big business, special interests, donors, and lobbyists who 
were “rigging the system” to favor themselves at the expense of the people.  
Trump’s attacks on politicians, the elite group he attacked the most, is covered in the next 
section of this paper, “Crisis of Representation.” It is unsurprising to find that Trump attacked 
the media the second most often, 226 times during the speeches included in this study. He spoke 
of the “elite media,” identifying the media as elite (7/21/16). Trump also tied reporters into what 
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he viewed as a corrupt political system, saying “reporters who work (for mainstream outlets) 
may think of themselves as reporters but they are actual cogs for a corrupt political machine” 
(10/12/16). He called out the media in a myriad of other ways: by referring to them as 
“dishonest” or “liars;” by charging them with unfair reporting and editing; by alleging an 
existence of a liberal bias and claiming the press was protecting Hillary; by referring to the press 
as stupid and bad people; and by calling out specific media outlets and personalities.  
 The most common way Trump called out the media was by referring to the press as 
dishonest, and he did this in almost every speech I listened to. He did this in several of different 
ways, including “the press is full of very dishonest people,” “the press is very dishonest,” “I was 
mistreated by these people, really the most dishonest people in the world,” “these dishonest 
people, mainstream media, they don’t talk about this,” and “see the dishonest people back there, 
the media” (7/11/15, 10/10/15, 1/8/16, 10/12/16, 11/7/16). He made similar statements in almost 
every other speech I listened to.1 Furthermore, Trump called the press liars several times, saying 
“the press are liars,” “they’re dirty rotten liars these people…they’re the most dishonest people,” 
and “Twitter is so great, when they lie (the press) I can just…type something out (and they have 
to report it)” (7/11/15, 5/27/16, 3/12/16). Trump simply calling the press dishonest or liars was 
the most frequent way in which he attacked the press.  
Trump also often accused the press of unfair reporting about him and unfair editing of his 
soundbites. The two main ways he did this was by accusing the press of never moving the 
cameras to show his crowds and by accusing them of editing his statements to make them sound 
bad. He made statements such as “the press never shows the crowds because they don’t want to,” 
“the only way the cameras turn is if they’re taking out a protestor…they don’t want to show the 
                                               
1 (7/25/15, 8/17/15, 8/25/15, 9/30/15, 10/29/15, 11/18/15, 12/5/15, 1/26/16, 2/29/16, 3/12/16, 3/19/16, 4/10/16, 
4/27/16, 5/2/16, 5/27/16, 6/2/16, 6/29/16, 7/12/16, 8/12/16, 10/12/16, 10/29/16, 11/7/16) 
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crowds,” and “I just wish the cameras could spin around and show the crowds, they never do it” 
at several rallies.2 Trump also complained about editing, complaining “I say the American dream 
is dead but I’m going to make it bigger and better than ever before…but they cut after dead,” and 
“but the dishonest media cuts it off there” (1/8/16, 8/12/16). 
 Trump also alleged that the press had a liberal bias and was protecting Hillary Clinton. 
He referred to the Des Moines Register as “a liberal rag” and told a crowd “all the newspapers 
are bad...any answer you give will be slanted negative if you’re a conservative Republican” 
(7/25/15, 5/27/16). As the general election campaign started, Trump told a crowd that “as a 
Republican, and as a Republican conservative, we are at a big disadvantage. If you take a look at 
how they (press) treat Crooked Hillary...” (7/12/16). Trump also argued that “the mainstream 
media is trying to protect Hillary” on several occasions, once arguing that “Hillary is being 
protected be the media, by the press, like no one has been protected in the history of the country. 
Me, on the other hand, it’s a total pile on” (5/27/16, 9/6/16). He also alleged that “the media is an 
extension of the Clinton campaign” (10/12/16). These complaints of a media with a liberal bias 
have been echoed by Republicans for years and were a major way Trump attacked the media.  
Furthermore, Trump argued that the press was full of stupid and bad people. Trump said 
often repeated statements such as “the pundits, most of whom are not smart people,” “I guarantee 
I’m smarter than all of them,” and “the press will say ‘He doesn’t believe in global 
warming…let’s do IQ tests” (6/29/15, 12/5/15, 4/10/16). Furthermore, he contended that the 
press was full of bad people, once telling a crowd “the press is not nice people, they don’t care 
about me, they don’t care about you, they don’t care about anything. The only thing they care 
about is ratings” (8/25/15). He also told crowds “reporters aren’t good people” and “the press are 
                                               
2 (9/30/15, 1/26/16, 3/19/16, 10/10/15, 11/30/15, 3/12/16, 4/10/16, 6/2/16, 6/29/16, 7/12/16, 8/12/16, 10/12/16, 
10/29/16) 
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terrible people” (7/11/15, 7/25/15, 12/21/15, 4/10/16, 10/29/16). He also referred to the press as 
“some of the worst human beings on earth,” and “scum” (7/12/16, 10/29/15).  
 Finally, Trump often called out specific media outlets and personalities for being unfair. 
Trump’s most frequent target was the New York Times, which he referred to as “a failing paper” 
that published “negative things they know are wrong,” as well as nicknaming it the “Failing New 
York Times” (4/10/16, 5/27/16, 3/12/15, 6/2/16, 10/12/16). Trump also disdained CNN, saying 
“CNN is terrible, they are brutal” as well as calling it out on a couple of other occasions 
(10/10/15, 11/30/15, 12/5/15). He called out Politico on several occasions, including saying “it’s 
a third-rate paper, its losing a ton of money,” (10/10/15, 10/29/15) as well as the Washington 
Post, saying “these phony stories in the Washington Post…what a rag” (4/10/16, 6/2/16, 
10/12/16). Other targets included NBC (6/29/15), the Huffington Post (10/29/15), CNBC 
(11/30/15, 10/12/16), ABC (12/21/15), The Wall Street Journal (3/12/16), the Boston Globe 
(4/10/16, 10/12/16), the Chicago Tribune (6/29/15) and Univision (10/12/16). By referring to 
them as “dishonest” or “liars;” charging them with unfair reporting and editing, alleging an 
existence of a liberal bias and claiming the press was protecting Hillary, referring to the press as 
stupid and bad people and by calling out specific media outlets and personalities, Trump went 
after the media as a part of the elite.  
 Trump spoke of a political elite of special interests, donors, lobbyists, and PACs, as well 
as a business elite of hedge fund managers, Wall Street, and “Big business.” In Trump’s mind, 
these elite groups controlled the politicians who were running the country through the donations 
they gave them. Without defining the terms, Trump painted a picture of a corrupt political 
system that was rigged against the people in favor of a small, rich, and powerful elite.  
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 To Trump, a former donor, donors were a main part of “the elite” that controlled the 
nation’s political system. He made 78 comments about donors during the speeches, claiming that 
“politicians are controlled by their donors” at almost every rally (11/30/15). This control occurs 
because “politicians only want to keep their jobs, so they treat donors like royalty,” and he knew 
this to be true because he “knew this business… I used to be a donor” (8/17/15, 8/12/16). 
 Trump tied donors into the larger political system, arguing that “the media, donor, political 
complex that’s bled this country dry for many years needs to be replaced by a new government 
of, for, and by the people” (8/21/16). Furthermore, “major donors are lining up behind (Hillary’s) 
campaign because they know she will keep the rigged system in place” (7/21/16). Donors who 
control politicians and have rigged the system to their benefit are a major part of Trump’s 
conception of the elite.  
 Trump made 57 comments about “special interests” in the speeches, without once 
defining what he meant. His main claim was that politicians are “controlled by the special 
interests,” and he made this claim in almost every speech I listened to (11/18/15). He argued that 
“special interests are supporting Bush and Rubio and Hillary,” and contrasted that with his own 
relationship to the “special interests,” saying “they’re going to have special interests call me, but 
I didn’t take their money” (9/30/15, 3/19/16). After listing several problems the country is 
facing, Trump charged that “it’s the special interests that do this stuff to our country, and they 
totally control Hillary Clinton” (6/29/16). 
 Again, it is hard to tell who Trump is referring to when he attacks the “special interests.” 
He told one crowd “lobbyists, special interests, donors- some of them are friends of mine,” 
which seems to imply that they are individuals (10/10/15). At the Republican convention, he said 
that some of the reforms he was proposing “would be opposed by some of the nation’s most 
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powerful special interests” because “these special interests have rigged our nation’s economic 
system for their exclusive benefit” (7/21/16). This quote makes it seem like the “special 
interests” Trump is referring to are business interests. However, he told a different crowd “you’re 
tired of a government that only works for Wall Street and the special interests,” which implies 
that Wall Street (or business generally) and the special interests are different entities (11/7/16). 
Other quotes, such as “families who have lost people to illegals have no special interests to 
represent them” and “my government reforms will make your voices heard, not the voices of the 
special interests” (7/21/16, 8/21/16). Finally, Trump’s statement “we’re going to break up the 
special interest monopoly and we’re going to win this election for the American people” makes it 
seem possible that the phrase “special interest” covers all involved in the process, donors, 
lobbyists, and politicians (10/21/16). Vaguely defined “special interests” were part of the elite in 
Trump’s populist imagination.  
 Lobbyists are another group in Trump’s elite, and he made 36 comments identifying 
lobbyists as elite during the speeches. Just like donors and special interests, Trump charged, 
“when lobbyists give money, they have total control over their little politician” (11/18/15). While 
talking about bringing jobs at Ford back to the United States, he gave the example of the 
politicians making the decision “getting a call from the lobbyist for Ford,” saying “you can’t do 
that to Ford, because Ford takes care of me and I take care of you” (6/16/15). Trump connects 
lobbyists to the broken political system at large, articulating that often “innocent people suffer 
because our political system…has sold out to some corporate lobbyist for cash” (7/21/16). He 
argued that he was different, because “it’s easy to turn down lobbyists when you don’t take their 
money” (10/10/15). 
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 The last link of the political elite Trump argued were controlling politicians were PACs, 
which he mentioned a mere eight times during the speeches, all during October and November of 
2015. Trump contended that “SuperPacs are a big scam- they control the candidates” and that 
“politicians are controlled like puppets by their PAC” (11/18/15, 10/29/15). He also lamented the 
effect SuperPacs were having on the political system as a whole, saying “the SuperPacs are 
controlling the system” and “SuperPacs are really hurting our political system” (10/29/15). 
Trump argued that SuperPacs were a tool used by lobbyists, alleging that “the lobbyists control 
(Republican opponents), usually through SuperPacs” (10/29/15). 
 Along with the political elite, Trump also identified hedge fund managers, Wall Street 
and “big business” as an economical elite. He mentioned hedge fund managers eight times and 
big business and Wall Street seven times. Interestingly, all but two of these mentions occurred in 
July 2016 or later, pointing that attacks on the economic elite were a part of Trump’s more 
professional campaign instead of his earlier rambling appeals. Both early mentions of hedge fund 
managers occurred in a speech delivered in September 2015, when Trump said “the hedge fund 
guys need to pay” and “my friends in the hedge fund business are going to start paying taxes” 
(9/12/15). He also compared campaign donations from hedge funds to himself and Hillary, 
saying that hedge fund managers “aren’t giving her money for their health, they’re not doing it 
for the good of the country” (8/12/16). Furthermore, he contended that “Hillary Clinton’s 
campaign is funded by hedge fund managers” (8/21/16, 9/16/16). 
 Trump referred to big business and Wall Street seven times, starting September 2016 and 
continuing through election day. He contended that “Hillary Clinton’s campaign is funded by 
Wall Street” (8/21/16, 9/16/16). Furthermore, “a vote for Hillary is a vote for…more Wall Street 
cheating” (10/12/16). During a campaign rally the day before the election, he told a crowd that 
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the people “are tired of a government that only works for Wall Street” (11/7/16). He also 
invoked big business, arguing that “big business” was “lining up behind the (Hillary) campaign 
because they know she will keep the rigged system in place” (7/21/16).  
 In Trump’s populist imagination, America’s government was controlled by donors, 
lobbyists, and special interests, who in turned control the elected officials they fund. The media 
is complicit in this rigging of the system, and the donors are often hedge fund managers or 
loosely defined as “Wall Street” or “Big business.”  These elite groups hurt the American people 
in their attempts to hold on to the power they enjoy. Attacks on these groups were the 
cornerstone of Trump’s campaign rhetoric.   
 
Common Sense 
Trump only appealed to “common sense” 12 times, which is not a significant amount of 
times when spread out throughout the 36 speeches. At times he used “common sense” as 
evidence to support his plans, such as during his campaign announcement, when he stated that “it 
only makes common sense, they’re not sending us the right people,” referring to his plan to stop 
illegal immigration (6/16/15). He once referred to his plan to fix the VA as “common sense.” 
(9/30/15). He sometimes attacked politicians by saying that they did not have common sense, 
saying “I hate to see when people don’t have common sense” (7/11/15). Finally, he referred to 
himself as “a common sense conservative” and touted that the movement he was representing 
was “a movement towards common sense,” repeating the second statement in several later 
speeches (2/29/16). Although he did mention “common sense” several times, an appeal to 
common sense was not a major part of Trump’s campaign rhetoric. 
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Crisis of Representation 
Trump spent much of his campaign discussing a crisis of representation and attacking 
“politicians” and the nation’s leaders. In the 36 speeches I listened to, he criticized politicians 
and the government 457 times, or roughly 13 times per speech. To say that criticizing the ruling 
class was a part of Trump’s campaign strategy would be an understatement. To Trump, 
America’s leaders were stupid, at times morally corrupt, controlled by donors and special 
interests, all talk and no action. Importantly, it was the leaders of both parties, not just 
Democrats, who were afflicted with the above ills.  
Above all, Trump believed that politicians are controlled by donors, special interests, and 
lobbyists. In his announcement speech, he contended that politicians are “controlled fully- 
they’re controlled fully by lobbyists, by the donors, and by the special interests” (7/16/15). On 
the topic of campaign donations, he notes that “when you see ads from Hillary or Bush or Rubio- 
that money is coming from special interests. And when they want something… (it gets done)” 
(9/30/15). Trump often touted the fact that he was self-funding his campaign, as opposed to his 
opponents; he argues that it is “always money with these politicians, money, money, money” 
(11/18/15). Trump also argued that donations change the way his opponents would govern. 
Speaking on his proposal to build a wall on the southern border, Trump argued that “Marco and 
Ted would do nothing because they are controlled by the lobbyists and the special interests” 
(3/21/15). During the general election campaign, he argued that Hillary Clinton would be unable 
to renegotiate trade deals because “her donors won’t allow her to do it” (8/12/16). Finally, in an 
October 2016 speech, Trump pointed to leaked emails, telling a crowd “how about where it said 
‘to the public you say this, to the ones that give you money say that” (10/12/16). Trump often 
argued that politicians were controlled by special interests, donors and lobbyists. 
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Furthermore, Trump argued that politicians and the political system are morally corrupt, 
stating in his announcement speech that “we have people that are morally corrupt. We have 
people who are selling this country down the drain” (6/16/15). Similarly, he argued that the 
politicians who were not stupid were “smart people who are basically corrupt” (6/29/16). Trump 
also argued that the primary system was corrupt, stating “We’ve got a corrupt system...we’re 
supposed to be a democracy” when it seemed possible that he could lose the nomination on the 
convention floor (4/10/16). He continued speaking about a “corrupt system” into the general 
election campaign, in reference to Hillary Clinton’s email scandals (7/12/16). 
A major Trump campaign theme was the incompetence of politicians. This theme 
surfaced early and often: in a July 2015 speech Trump said plainly, “we have incompetent 
politicians” (7/11/15). At times Trump was incredulous at what he viewed as the incompetence 
of politicians, saying “these politicians don’t know anything…can you believe the 
incompetence” (11/30/15). After complaining that many did not think he was nice, Trump said 
that it did not matter, and that “this is going to be an election of competence, not niceness” 
(1/8/16). In a speech in April 2016, Trump told a crowd “we’re not going to let our very 
incompetent politicians take advantage of us anymore” (4/27/16). Finally, in October of 2016, 
Trump told a crowd that “we have people who don’t know what they’re doing…we need 
competence and we need it fast” (10/12/16). The theme of returning competence to the 
Washington was a key appeal to voters made by the Trump campaign.  
Trump also frequently mentioned how America’s leaders were an international 
laughingstock. Early in his campaign, Trump, referring to America’s leaders, said “we’re a 
laughingstock, we’re a joke, we’re all a bunch of clowns” (6/29/15). At the end of his campaign, 
Trump remarked “other countries are laughing at us,” and “the whole world is laughing at our 
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country” (10/12/16, 11/7/16). These claims, that America was being taken advantage of by other 
countries because of the incompetence of America’s leaders, was one way that Trump invoked a 
crisis of representation to drum up support for his outsider candidacy.  
The word that Trump used most often to attack politicians was “stupid,” as he referred to 
the stupidity of politicians at nearly all of the speeches. At his campaign announcement, Trump 
asked his audience “how stupid are our leader? How stupid are these politicians?” (7/16/15). 
Trump often used “stupid” as an adjective while talking about politicians, such as when he said 
“our stupid politicians say Mexico won’t pay for the wall” (10/10/15). This language continued 
throughout the campaign, with examples being Trump saying “we have stupid leadership” in 
February 2016 and “we have stupid people in June 2016” (2/29/16, 6/29/16). To Trump, the 
American people were suffering because they were electing stupid people to lead them. 
 Along with moral corruption, incompetence, and stupidity, Trump argued that America’s 
leaders were weak. In March 2016, he asked his crowd, “can you imagine what these people 
(foreign leaders) say about the United States? How weak we are, how ineffective we are, and, 
frankly, how stupid we are?” (3/12/16). In October, Trump promised “We’re not going to be the 
stupid, weak people anymore” (10/12/16). Trump ran a campaign based around competence, 
intelligence, strength, and an independence from donors and special interests, traits which he 
alleged the nation’s leaders were badly lacking.   
 Interestingly, Trump did not only direct his anger at Democratic politicians, but instead at 
politicians generally. He never specified that only Democrats were “controlled by special 
interests” or that only Democrats were stupid. At times he even specifically attacked policies that 
had been supported or implemented by Republicans in the past, such as trade deals and the Iraq 
War. In fact, a couple of times he said “I’m more disappointed in the Republican in many ways, 
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they talk and talk” (7/11/15). He also linked the two parties several times, saying “Democrats 
and Republicans, they can’t do this, folks” (9/30/15). As his campaign ended, Trump said 
“Hillary and our failed establishment have dragged us into foreign wars” (11/7/16). Trump’s 
attacks on politicians in general set him apart from more traditional politicians in both parties 
who usually focus on attacking only the other party.    
 Despite attacking both Democratic and Republican politicians, one way in which Trump 
specifically attacked Democrats and the current governing regime was by alleging that Hillary 
Clinton was being protected by the Obama administration in regards to her email scandal. Trump 
argued that “the Justice Department has proven itself to be a political arm of the White House” 
and that “after the FBI whitewashed Hillary Clinton’s email crimes, they cannot be trusted to 
investigate her new crimes” (8/21/16). He believed that Hillary was “being protected by the 
Democrats” and that she was “being protected by a rigged system” (12/5/15, 11/7/16). In the 
mind of Donald Trump, the protection of Hillary Clinton from “her email crimes” was yet 
another way that the government was failing the American people.  
 Of the populist components studied in this paper, Donald Trump made the most use of 
invoking a crisis of representation. He invoked this crisis by attacking politicians as weak, 
stupid, and incompetent. He contended that America’s leaders were controlled by those who give 
them donations and had become an international laughingstock. Interestingly, he attacked 
politicians of both parties, but often contended that the Democrats who were in power at the time 
were protecting Hillary Clinton. Through these attacks on politicians and American’s leaders, 
Trump invoked a crisis of representation that he argued only he could fix.   
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No Negotiation, Deliberation, or Compromise 
 While both Moffitt and Mudde contend that populists do not engage in negotiation, 
deliberation, or compromise, I found that Trump made statements showing an openness to 
negotiation and deal-making 82 times over the course of the speeches, while making statements 
that demonstrated an appeal to action over talk 25 times. The main ways in which Trump showed 
an openness to negotiation were by touting himself as the author of “The Art of the Deal,” 
discussing how he would be better at negotiating trade deals than the current leaders, and by 
talking about the importance of negotiation and deal-making. On the other hand, he often 
referred to politicians as “all talk, no action,” indicating a preference for action over deliberation. 
While keeping these “all talk, no action” statements in mind, it is clear that Trump does not act 
as a populist would be expected to act in this regard.  
 Trump spent a great deal of time demonstrating an interest in negotiation and deal 
making. During his introduction speech, Trump said “we need a leader that wrote ‘The Art of the 
Deal’” (6/16/15). He was fond of referring to the Art of the Deal as “one of the best books of all 
time” (3/19/16). He touted his deal-making ability several times, including saying “I make good 
deals. I could get other guys- great dealmakers” (7/25/15). He often argued that he would be 
better at making trade deals than his opponents, including asking a crowd “Who would you 
rather have making deals for you? Trump or Jeb? Trump or Hillary?” (8/17/15). Trump often 
pointed to his deal-making experience as a qualification for office, noting “I’ve done so many 
deals” and “I’ll make great deals, not terrible deals” (6/2/16, 7/12/16). For these reasons, Trump 
does not behave a Mudde and Moffitt would expect a populist to behave on the topic of being 
open to negotiation and deal-making.  
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 On the other hand, Trump often remarked that politicians were “all talk, no action.” He 
made this claim many times throughout the campaign, stating, for example, that “politicians are 
all talk, no action” many times (8/25/15). He often implied that this prevented politicians from 
being able to accomplish anything, arguing “your local politician- he won’t fix anything but at 
least he’ll talk to you” and “all talk, no action politicians, nothing is going to get done” (8/17/15, 
11/18/15). These claims are the type of claims that Moffitt and Mudde would expect to hear from 
a populist leader. While Trump clearly fits the bill as a populist in his invocation of a crisis of 
representation, the evidence for him acting as Moffitt and Mudde would expect on the topic of 
negotiation and deal-making is much more mixed.   
 
How Trump Fit into the Components Shared by Both Moffitt and Mudde 
Moffitt and Mudde both expect populists to use the “the people” vs. “the elite” 
dichotomy, use the term “common sense,” invoke a crisis of representation, and oppose 
negotiation and compromise. Trump often spoke of “the people,” especially after the Republican 
convention, and attacked the groups he defined as elite an astonishing amount of times. Another 
major part of his campaign rhetoric was invoking a crisis of representation, which he often did at 
the same time as attacking politicians an elite. Finally, Trump rarely spoke of “common sense” 
and while he did sometimes oppose negotiation and compromise, he also bragged about his skill 
at negotiating, meaning the results were mixed.   
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Components Specific to Moffitt 
Attacking “Others”  
Moffitt argues that populists “may also target others- such as asylum seekers, immigrant 
workers, or particular minority groups” as “enemies of the people” and that these “others” will 
be linked to “the elite” (Moffitt 2016, 55). Along with the groups Trump identifies as elite- 
politicians, the media, special interests, donors, lobbyists, PACs and hedge fund managers/Wall 
Street/big business, Trump identifies several groups as “other,” including Muslims, 
undocumented immigrants, refugees, Black Lives Matter and protestors. To Trump, these groups 
were being favored by the ruling class over “the people,” which did not include these “other” 
groups.  
  The most frequent group to be identified by Trump as “other” were undocumented 
immigrants, mostly from Mexico. Trump attacked this group 78 times during the speeches. 
Beginning with the statement that started his campaign, that these immigrants were “bringing 
drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists,” attacks on undocumented immigrants were a 
key part of Trump’s campaign rallies (6/16/15). The main ways he did this was through charging 
that undocumented immigrants were murderers, rapists, and members of gangs, by arguing that 
undocumented immigrants were taking American jobs and threating American safety, and by 
pointing to specific examples of those killed by illegal immigrants.   
 Instead of backtracking after the initial controversy, Trump doubled down, reminding a 
crowd early in his campaign that “I said killers, I said drug dealers, and I said rapists,” and re-
affirming immediately before the general election that undocumented immigrants were “killers, 
drug lords and gang members” (6/29/15, 10/29/16). He charged that many undocumented 
immigrants became gang members, making comments such as “these gangs you’ve heard about, 
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a lot of them are illegals” on several occasions throughout the campaign (9/12/15, 11/18/15, 
1/26/16). He also alleged that undocumented immigrants were taking American jobs, saying that 
the people “don’t want people pouring in, taking their jobs and taking their homes,” and that “we 
need to protect American jobs, we need to protect American safety” (6/29/16, 9/12/15). Finally, 
killing two birds with one stone, Trump told a crowd that “illegal immigrants are being taken 
care of better than our veterans” (10/10/15, 5/2/16). Trump had no problem coming up with 
many different ways to identify undocumented immigrants as “other.” 
 The most frequent way Trump attacked undocumented immigrants was by portraying 
them as a threat to American safety and by mentioning specific instances of crimes they 
committed. He argued early in the campaign that “we’ve got to get rid of the bad ones, we have a 
lot of bad ones,” and painted a picture during his speech at the Republican convention of 
“nearly 1,000 illegal immigrants with criminal records…roaming free to threaten peaceful 
citizens” (9/12/15, 7/21/16). At many of the speeches I listened to, he spoke of specific instances 
of people being killed by undocumented immigrants.3 The individuals he mentioned the most 
often were Kate Steinle, Jamiel Shaw, and an unnamed woman who was “raped, sodomized and 
killed by an illegal” (5/27/16). Going past the naming of individuals, Trump vaguely referred to 
“thousands of other incidences” and said after naming three victims that they were “just three 
representations of the many thousands who have suffered so gravely” (11/18/15, 7/21/16). 
Throughout the campaign, Trump identified undocumented immigrants as “other” by bringing up 
people “sacrificed on the altar of open borders” (7/21/16). 
                                               
3 7/11/15, 7/25/15, 8/17/15, 9/30/15, 11/18/15, 11/30/15, 12/5/15, 3/19/16, 5/27/16, 7/21/16, 8/21/16, 10/12/16, 
10/29/16, 11/7/16 
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 Trump made statements identifying Muslims as “other” 33 times during the speeches. He 
used the problematic term “radical Islamic terrorism” at many of his rallies4 He told one crowd 
that a way the immigration system was broken was that “If you’re a Christian from Syria its 
impossible to come into the United States, if you’re a Muslim from Syria it’s one of the easiest 
things to do” (9/12/15). He asked a crowd “why are we letting people in when they have a track 
record of violence all over the world?” (8/12/16). At two of the campaign events I listened to, 
Trump also told a discredited story about how General Pershing dipped bullets in pig’s blood to 
discourage Islamic terrorism, further identifying Muslims as “other” (2/29/16, 3/12/16). 
 Another way Trump identified Muslims as other was by promoting conspiracy theories 
that knowledge of terrorist plots was widespread in Muslim communities but that Muslims were 
not turning in people they knew to be planning attacks. He told one crowd that “a lot of 
(Muslims) knew (about the San Bernardino attack before it happened)” and “you have to be 
vigilant…I’ve talked about the mosques…there’s something bad happening folks” (12/5/15). He 
told other crowds similarly vague but frightening statements about Muslims, such as “we have to 
figure out what the hell is going on” in Muslim communities and “we need to look at the 
Muslims and we need to do something” (1/8/16, 4/10/16). He was clearer on what he meant in a 
later rally, spelling it out to a crowd that “Muslims have to report the bad ones…they see what’s 
going on and they don’t report” (5/27/16). By pushing these conspiracy theories and in the ways 
presented in the last paragraph, Trump identified Muslims as “other.” 
 Similarly, Trump identified Syrian refugees as “other” 33 times throughout the campaign. 
The most frequent he did this was by linking them to ISIS. He told one crowd “we want to take 
in all these Syrians- they could be ISIS, I don’t know” and another “the refugees could be 
                                               
4 11/30/15, 1/8/16, 2/19/16, 3/12/16, 4/10/16, 5/27/16, 7/21/16, 9/6/16, 9/16/16, 10/12/16, 10/29/16, 11/7/16 
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ISIS…and they probably are ISIS…they have ISIS flags on their cell phones” (9/30/15, 1/8/16). 
Similarly, he told a different crowd that “ISIS is probably rampant here too…we’re taking in so 
many people, we have no idea who they are” (8/12/16). Without directly invoking ISIS, Trump 
made the same point, telling one crowd “we cannot allow people who want to destroy this 
country into our country…we cannot let Syrian refugees into our country” and another “we’re 
going to stop the flow of refugees into our country and keep radical Islamic terrorists the hell out 
of our country” (3/12/16, 10/29/16). 
 Trump also identified Syrian refugees as “other” by saying they were dangerous without 
directly connecting them to ISIS. He said several different times that the Syrian refugees “could 
be the great Trojan Horse of all time” (11/18/15, 8/12/16, 9/6/16). and read a poem called “the 
Snake” to one crowd, which was about a snake who bites a person caring for it before saying 
“you knew damn well I was a snake, before you let me in” (8/12/16). As evidence to his claims 
he told crowds that “refugees are all young men, they’re tough looking cookies” and that there 
were “Syrians who look awfully strong” (11/18/15, 11/30/15). He often told crowds that “we 
have no idea who they are” (2/29/16, 3/19/16, 5/27/16, 7/12/16, 7/21/16, 8/12/16). Finally, 
during several rallies near the end of the campaign, he criticized Hillary Clinton, telling crowds 
“Hillary wants 550% increase in refugees” (7/21/16, 9/6/16, 10/12/16, 11/7/16). By directly and 
indirectly linking Syrian refugees to ISIS, Trump identified them as “other” at his campaign 
rallies.  
 Trump made comments identifying “Black Lives Matter” as “other” 28 times during the 
campaign rallies I listened to. He did this mostly through the use of coded language, by praising 
the police and lamenting how badly they are being treated. The only time Trump directly 
identified an opposition to “Black Lives Matter” during the speeches was when he told a crowd 
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“all lives matter” shortly before saying “I want to thank the police; you guys are great” (2/29/16). 
Comments similar to the latter were the main way he identified “Black Lives Matter” activists as 
other throughout the campaign. He told crowds “we need to start honoring and respecting our 
police,” “do we love our police? They are not treated fairly” and promised that should he win, 
“we are going to treat our police with respect” (12/5/15, 5/27/16, 7/12/16). More dramatically, he 
remarked during his speech at the Republican convention that “the attacks on our 
police…threaten our very way of life” (7/21/16). He lamented that “today if a policeman talks 
the wrong way they go to jail for the rest of their life” and asserted that “we will keep our 
children safe…which requires supporting our law enforcement” (5/27/16, 9/616). These coded 
attacks on Black Lives Matter were the only way Trump attacked African-Americans, making 
attacks on African-Americans not a large part of Trump’s campaign.  
 An easy group for Trump to call out as “other” were protestors, and he called out 
protestors nine times throughout the campaign. He said protestors were “misguided- they don’t 
get it” and referred to them as “the enemy” (11/18/15, 2/29/16). Trump alleged that many 
protestors had substance abuse problems, saying that he could probably change a protestor’s 
mind “unless there’s a substance abuse problem, which there really might be” (1/26/16). He 
called out individual protestors, telling one “go home to Mommy,” calling another one “a loser” 
and mocking one for being overweight, saying “I mentioned food stamps and that guy who’s 
seriously obese just went crazy” (8/12/16, 12/21/15, 11/18/15).  
 Trump also linked protestors to outside groups and countries. He asked one “are you 
from Mexico” and spoke of protestors who “burned the American flag and held up flags from 
other countries” (2/29/16, 5/2/16). A major claim that Trump made was that protestors were 
being sent in by outside groups, often without specifying who was behind sending them to the 
  
Quigley 57 
rallies. He told one crowd that “when they have professionally staged wise guys, we have got to 
fight back,” pondered “where do these people come from” and told another crowd that “they 
send them in (protestors) with a little Bernie sign…made in China” (3/12/16, 4/10/16, 6/2/16). 
By raising questions about the origins of the protestors and making it seem impossible that they 
were there on their own volition, Trump identified protestors as “other.” By attacking groups as 
“other,” Trump behaves precisely as Moffitt would expect a populist to behave.  
 
Political Correctness 
 Donald Trump articulated an opposition to “political correctness” 18 times, or once every 
two speeches. Most of his anti-political correctness statements were simple. For example, in a 
speech in June 2015, he told a crowd “we have to be less politically correct” (6/29/15). He also 
argued that America’s political correctness was hurting its ability to succeed as a country, 
arguing that “we’ve become so politically correct as a country we can’t even walk, we can’t 
think properly, we can’t do anything” and “we have become so politically correct that we are 
impotent as a country” (9/30/15, 3/19/16). At times Trump pointed to political correctness as a 
limitation that must be obeyed, such as when he said “we have to be politically correct” (instead 
of being violent towards protestors) (1/8/16). While interesting, these statements made up a very 
small amount of his overall campaign speeches and were not a significant part of the campaign. 
 
Opposed to Bureaucrats/Technocrats/Experts 
 As outlined by Moffitt, populists often show that they are opposed to bureaucrats, 
technocrats, and experts. Trump made 28 statements throughout the speeches that showed an 
opposition to this group, most of which dealt with Common Core. Trump promisied crowds that 
  
Quigley 58 
“education will be local…we don’t want our children educated by bureaucrats from Washington, 
D.C” (3/19/16). Trump also made a couple of statements that showed a distrust of economists. 
He told crowds that “economists are some of the great geniuses who have never made a dollar in 
their lives” and once said that “according to the economists- who I’m not a big believer in” 
(9/30/15, 6/16/15).  
 Trump also demonstrated a distrust in political consultants and academics. During a 
campaign stop at the beginning of the general election campaign, he told a crowd: “I’ve been 
told by all these geniuses ‘you can’t win California.’ I think I can” (6/2/16). He also showed a 
disdain for academia, as he once encouraged boos by saying “the architect of 
Obamacare…remember from MIT?” and smiling as the boos rained down (10/29/16). Finally, 
Trump made one statement that was opposed to bureaucrats in general, remarking during his 
speech at the Republican convention that “my opponent would rather protect bureaucrats than 
serve American children” (7/21/16). Overall, while Trump did hammer on the point that he 
wanted the nation’s children educated locally and not by bureaucrats, a general opposition to 
bureaucrats, technocrats and experts was not a major part of his campaign rhetoric.  
 
Bad Manners  
 Trump demonstrated the bad manners expected of a populist 117 times during the 
speeches included in this study. An example of bad manners as described by Moffitt is “ready 
resort to anecdotes as evidence” (Moffitt 2016, 55). During his campaign announcement speech, 
he referred to three such people he knew as evidence of larger issues: “a friend who’s a doctor,” 
“a friend of mine is a great manufacturer,” and “a woman was on television this morning” 
(6/16/15). Early on during his campaign, Trump told the same story at almost every rally, about a 
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friend who used to buy American but now only buys from China because it is much cheaper 
(6/16/15, 7/11/15, 7/25/15, 2/19/16). This use of anecdote as evidence continued throughout the 
campaign, with Trump invoking his “friend the businessman,” “a doctor who came up to me,” 
and “friends who go to France every year,” among others (12/21/15, 2/19/16, 9/6/16). Trump 
uses anecdotes as evidence in exactly the way Moffitt would expect a populist would.  
 Trump also demonstrated bad manners by making fun of his opponents, protestors and, 
once, giving out the personal phone number of an opponent. To press the point of the 
incompetence of America’s negotiators, Trump made fun of John Kerry at several of the rallies 
for getting injured during a bicycle race (6/29/15, 7/11/15, 8/25/15, 7/12/16).  During a campaign 
rally in October 2016, he mocked Hillary Clinton for fainting the month before (10/12/16). He 
once took it one step further, reading out the personal phone number of Lindsay Graham at a 
rally and encouraging the crowd to call it (8/17/15). Finally, Trump made fun of protestors 
several times during the campaign. He once told one “you are a loser” and mocked another 
protestor for being overweight, saying “I mentioned foot stamps and that guy who’s seriously 
obese just went crazy” (12/21/15, 11/18/15). While it did not occur during one of the speeches I 
listened to, Trump’s infamous attack on a handicapped reporter is another example of this 
behavior. By making fun of opponents and protestors, Trump once again demonstrated bad 
manners.  
 Many times during the campaign Trump demonstrated an affinity for conspiracy and an 
ignorance of that which did not interest him. Either unwilling or unable to accept that protestors 
could attend his rally without an outside incentive, Trump once said “I wonder if the Mexican 
government sent them over here, I think so” (7/11/15). As his campaign came to an end, he 
articulated that it was the Clinton campaign that was incentivizing protestors, saying “we just 
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found out Hillary Clinton was paying the protestors $1500 each to be violent at our rallies” 
(10/29/16). As the general election grew near, Trump got very concerned about voting fraud, 
mentioning at several rallies that his voters must watch the polling places for incidences of voter 
fraud (8/12/16, 8/21/16, 9/6/16, 10/29/16). Examples of this concern can be seen in statements 
such as “we don’t want people voting five times” and “the only way we can lose is if cheating 
goes on” (8/12/16). Finally, Trump demonstrated an ignorance of that which did not interest him 
a couple times, saying “according to what I heard, which is probably true” during one campaign 
rally and “I don’t know, I don’t read about it” concerning America’s infrastructure at another 
(10/29/15, 8/12/16).  
 Another way Trump demonstrated bad manners was by doing negative impressions of 
people, swearing, and by alluding to the size of his genitalia. In a rally in August 2015, he did a 
racially based impression of a Japanese businessman, saying “He says ‘We want deal’” 
(8/25/15). Trump swore 14 times during the campaign rallies I listened to, using a variety of 
curse words, including “jackass,” “ass,” “bullshit,” “shit,” “dumbass,” and “chickenshit.”5 He 
used these words in several different ways, once telling a crowd “I’m working my ass off,” once 
criticizing “dumbass politicians,” and promising a crowd that he would “knock the shit out of 
ISIS” (8/25/15, 11/30/15, 1/8/16). Finally, at one rally, Trump alluded to the size of his genitalia, 
saying “they’re bigger than most, maybe not Nick’s (Trump supporter, NFL star Nick Mangold). 
Hands, I’m talking about hands” (3/12/16).  
Many of Trump’s attacks on Hillary Clinton were based on her appearance or gender and 
were attacks that more traditional politicians would not engage in. Referring to an instance in 
which Hillary used the restroom during a Democratic debate, Trump said “I know where Hillary 
                                               
5 (8/17/15, 8/25/15, 9/30/15, 11/30/15, 12/5/15, 1/8/16, 5/27/16) 
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went during the debate, its disgusting” (12/21/15). During the general election campaign, he 
asked a crowd “do you think Hillary looks presidential?” and said that “Hillary does not look 
Presidential…that is not a President” (5/27/16, 6/2/16). He also once said Hillary “got 
schlonged” (12/21/15). An article in the Washington Post described this as a sexist remark, as 
“schlong is a well-known reference to a man’s genitals” and “there are no alternative definitions 
for the word, according to Merriam-Webster” (Moyer 2015). These attacks, based on Hillary’s 
appearance and gender were another way that Trump demonstrated bad manners.  
 The two most prominent ways that Trump demonstrated the bad manners expected from 
populists is by advocating for violence and calling his opponents name. He advocated for 
violence during several of the campaign rallies that I listened to. Praising the toughness of 
General Patton, he said that “General Patton would smack the reporter in the face, kick him in 
the lips, give a smack to that guy” (9/30/15). Trump also advocated violence towards those who 
were protesting his rallies a couple of time: during a rally at the University of Iowa, while a 
woman was protesting, he asked the crowd “do you want to let the football team take care of it?” 
(1/26/16). He followed this up by asking the crowd, “Am I allowed to rip the whistle out of her 
mouth? Should somebody do that?” (1/26/16). These advocations of violence are yet another 
way that Trump demonstrated bad manners.  
 Finally, the last way that Trump demonstrated bad manners was by calling his opponents 
names. The three most popular of these nicknames were “Little Marco,” which Trump used 
seven times (2/29/16, 3/12/16); “Lyin’ Ted,” which Trump used fourteen times6; and “Crooked 
Hillary,” which Trump used twenty times.7 Trump also nicknamed Jeb Bush as “Low-energy 
Jeb” (10/10/15, 5/2/16) and Bernie Sanders as “Crazy Bernie” (6/2/16). He attacked Bernie on a 
                                               
6 3/12/16, 3/19/16, 4/10/16, 4/27/16, 5/2/16, 5/27/16, 6/2/16 
7 4/27/16, 5/2/16, 5/27/16, 6/2/16, 6/29/16, 8/12/16, 9/16/16, 10/12/16, 11/7/16 
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couple of occasions, referring to him as “our communist friend,” and “a nutjob,” as well as 
referring to Democratic presidential candidate Martin O’Malley as a “clown” (3/12/16, 6/2/16, 
1/8/16). Trump linked his opponents to animals a couple times during the speeches, saying that 
“Marco Rubio is sweating like a pig” and that Mitt Romney “was a choking dog” (10/10/15, 
5/27/16). He also tried out a couple of nicknames for Hillary Clinton before settling on “Crooked 
Hillary,” including “Lyin’ Hillary” and “Hillary Rotten Clinton” (6/2/16, 8/12/16).  
 In conclusion, Trump absolutely demonstrated the bad manners that would be expected 
of a populist in Moffitt’s definition of populism. These bad manners included swearing, using 
anecdotes as evidence, making fun of the injured, spreading conspiracy theories, giving out the 
personal phone number of an opponent, doing impressions of foreigners, advocating violence, 
name-calling, alluding to the size of his genitalia, and an ignorance of that which did not interest 
him. While not easily quantifiable, it was clear that Trump also engaged in the directness, 
playfulness, and bullying that Moffitt would expect. Of the categories I studied, bad manners is 
one of the ones that Trump exhibited most obviously.  
 
How Trump fits into Moffitt’s Definition of Populism 
 Moffit expects populists to target “others,” oppose political correctness, bureaucrats, and 
experts, and demonstrate bad manners. Of these components, Trump called out “others” (188 
times) and demonstrated bad manners (117 times) the most. On the other hand, the populist 
components of common sense, opposing political correctness, and opposing bureaucrats, 
technocrats and experts were present but not a major part of Trump’s campaign rhetoric. Trump 
actually signaled a willingness to negotiate and compromise 25 times throughout the campaign, 
leaving mixed results for the expectation that populists will oppose negotiation, deliberation, and 
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compromise. He mentioned common sense only 12 times, political correctness 18 times, and an 
opposition to bureaucrats and experts 28 times, often through vague comments about making 
education local. He made statements elevating action over negotiation, deliberation, and 
compromise 82 times, which is significant, but also made 25 statements signaling an openness to 
negotiation and compromise, relatively mixed results. 
 For the most part, Trump fit into Moffitt’s definition of populism. Most important to 
Moffitt are the use of “the people” and “the elite,” a crisis of representation, and bad manners, 
three components that were the cornerstones of Trump’s campaign speeches. However, Trump 
mentioned common sense, political correctness, and an opposition to bureaucrats and experts less 
than expected, and he actually made comments signaling an openness to negotiation and 
compromise, which is also not expected by a populist in Moffitt’s definition. While Trump 
would surely classify as a populist in Moffitt’s definition, he is not a perfect fit.   
 
Components Specific to Mudde 
Evil Opponents   
 A component specific to Mudde is the belief that to a populist, their “opponents are not 
just people with different priorities and values, they are evil!” (Mudde 2004: 544). While Trump 
made 29 comments that pointed towards him viewing his opponents as evil, he made 33 
comments that depicted his opponents as generally good people: decidedly mixed results. On the 
topic of evil opponents, reporters were Trump’s main target. He put it simply on several 
occasions, making statements such as “reporters aren’t good people” and “the press are terrible 
people” (7/11/15, 7/25/15, 12/21/15, 4/10/16, 10/29/16). He would go further, telling a crowd 
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that the press “are some of the worst human beings on earth,” and once referred to the press as 
“scum” (7/12/16, 10/29/15). Trump often portrayed the press as an evil opponent. 
 Along with the press, Trump pronounced that politicians and protestors were not good 
people on several occasions. During his campaign announcement, he told the people in Trump 
tower that America’s leaders were “morally corrupt” (6/16/15). Without saying which ones, he 
told a crowd in November 2015 that “some (of his Republican opponents) are terrible people” 
(11/30/15). He was clearer on how he viewed Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush on several occasions, 
saying that “Jeb was not a nice guy,” and “Hillary is a bad person” (3/12/16, 6/2/16). 
Furthermore, he alluded to Hillary as “the devil” when he said that “Bernie sold his soul to the 
devil (by supporting Hillary)” (10/29/16, 11/7/16). Finally, on a couple of occasions he called 
out individual protestors, saying that one was “a bad guy” and that another was “not a good 
person” (12/21/15, 1/8/16).  
 On the other hand, Trump often told crowds that his opponents were not bad people. 
Contradicting himself on whether Jeb Bush is a good person, Trump said “Jeb Bush is a good 
guy,” and “Jeb Bush is a really nice person” several times (6/29/15, 11/18/15, 8/17/15, 8/25/15, 
10/10/15). He told a crowd that his Republican opponents were “all nice people” (1/8/16) and 
specifically referred to the following people as “nice” or “good people”: Chris Christie (6/29/15, 
5/2/16), Rick Perry (9/12/15, 11/30/15, 12/5/15), Ben Carson (9/12/15, 12/5/15, 5/2/16), Carly 
Fiorina (10/10/15, 5/2/16), Ted Cruz (11/30/15, 6/2/16), Scott Walker (12/5/15), Lindsay 
Graham (1/8/16), John Kasich (3/19/16, 5/2/16, 6/2/16), Marco Rubio (8/25/15, 10/10/15, 
11/18/15) and Mitt Romney (10/10/15, 1/26/16).  
 Trump extended his goodwill even towards politicians in general, several democratic 
politicians, and prominent members of the media. He told crowds “I don’t think our leaders are 
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bad people” and that politicians “are for the most part nice people” (7/11/15, 10/10/15). Despite 
criticizing both many times throughout his campaign, Trump told one crowd that “John Kerry is 
a nice man” and that he did not “think Obama is a bad person” (6/29/15, 7/11/15). Surprisingly, 
Trump also identified prominent members of the media as good people, namely Don Lemon, Jeff 
Zucker (CEO of CNN), Joe Scarborough, Bill Maher, and Wolf Blitzer (9/30/15, 8/25/15, 
10/29/15, 1/26/16). Overall, on the topic of whether Trump behaves as a populist would be 
expected to regarding the morality of their opponents, there are mixed results. On one hand, 
Trump at times referred to the media, politicians, and individual protestors as being bad people. 
On the other, Trump often referred to many of the members of the above groups as good people, 
including almost all of his political opponents. These mixed results suggest that Trump does not 
behave exactly as a populist would be expected to on this topic.  
 
New Party     
 Mudde writes that populists “oppose the established parties” and “call for, or claim to be, 
a new kind of party” (Mudde 2004: 546). In his invocations of a crisis of representation, Trump 
surely opposes the established parties and sets himself up as a non-political outsider who could 
shake up the system. For this section, however, I recorded the times that Trump criticized his 
Republican party or made statements that linked the parties as being practically the same. He 
made claims along these lines 23 times, and claims supporting the Republican Party four times. 
Trump did not once call to create his own party or end up running as an independent; rather, he 
reshaped the Republican Party in his own image. Technically, Trump did not “call for, or claim 
to be a new kind of party,” but he did represent a change in the Republican party. For these 
reasons, the results for this component of populism are rather inconclusive.  
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 Trump linked the two parties as being similar and similarly unable to get the job done. He 
told one crowd “Democrats and Republicans, they can’t do this folks,” separating himself from 
the two major parties, including his own (9/30/15). A couple times during the campaign he made 
statements linking the two major parties, including comparing Hillary Clinton and Republican 
frontrunner at the time Jeb Bush by saying “it’s all the same, the system is all the same” 
(7/25/15). Similarly, he once told a crowd that “special interests are supporting Bush and Rubio 
and Hillary,” not differentiating between the two parties (9/30/15). Statements such as this one 
and many of the ones included in the “crisis of representation” section of this paper demonstrate 
how Trump often set himself apart from “politicians” and “the nation’s leaders,” not quite calling 
for the creation of a new party but surely making it known that he represented a change with the 
way our country has been run in recent history, by both parties. 
Trump also made many statements criticizing his party, the Republican Party. Separating 
himself from the party, he once told a crowd “we’re driving the Republican establishment crazy, 
because they want their puppet” (11/30/15). He spoke out against congressional Republicans on 
several occasions, telling a crowd “I’m more angry with Republicans than I am with the 
Democrats,” and, similarly, “I’m more disappointed in the Republicans in many ways, they talk 
and talk” (12/21/15, 7/11/15). He echoed this complaint, that congressional Republicans were 
failing in their duty to deliver for their voters, several times, telling one crowd “the Republicans 
are constantly bailing Obama out” and telling another “these politicians gets elected and go to 
Washington and do a total fold” (2/19/16 12/21/15). Trump’s criticisms of the Republican party 
went beyond what most politicians would say about their own parties. 
Finally, Trump made four statements during his campaign praising the Republican party 
and his partnership with the RNC. Disputing reports that his relationship with the Republican 
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party had soured, Trump told a crowd “we’re raising a lot of money for the Republicans…Reince 
(Priebus) has done an incredible job,” before promising the crowd “if we had a bad relationship, 
you’d be the first to know” (8/12/16). During his short victory speech, he called Reince on stage 
and told his supporters that “our partnership with the RNC was so important in our success” 
(11/9/16). Despite criticizing both parties and making it clear that he represented a drastic 
change, Trump ran as a Republican, leaving no strong conclusions to be drawn as to whether he 
represented “a new type of party” in the words of Mudde.  
 
Supports Experts 
 There is little evidence to support the assertion that Trump supported experts, as Mudde 
argued populists can. He made a mere two statements voicing a support for experts. He told one 
crowd “I’m a big person for academia, I believe in it,” and another “some of the greatest legal 
experts supported me” on his assertion that people born in the U.S to undocumented immigrants 
should not be US citizens (9/30/15, 10/10/15). On the contrary, he made several statements that 
showed a distrust of experts, including academic experts (the creator of Obamacare from MIT 
mentioned earlier) and climate scientists. He told one crowd that “it was supposed to be warm 
today, but it’s freezing…I need some global warming!” and another “they say global warming, 
they say something else, it changes every day” (4/10/16, 6/29/15). Trump’s limited use of 
rhetoric that showed support for experts and attacks on experts show that he is not the kind of 
expert-supporting populist that Mudde argues exists. 
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Connected to Elite 
 Mudde argues that populists connect themselves to the elite without being a part of them, 
and Trump certainly fits this bill, as he made 110 statements during the campaign that in which 
he linked himself to the elite. Trump often bragged that no one knew the system as well as he 
did, which would allow him to fix it. He regularly spoke on how he was connected to politicians, 
lobbyists, and other donors from his years of donating to politicians and being a rich 
businessman. He also often mentioned his Ivy League education (He graduated with a Bachelor 
of Science in Economics from the Wharton School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania) 
and how rich he was, as well as name-dropping celebrities who he knew. Being connected to the 
elite was a major part of Trump’s campaign rhetoric.  
 Trump often bragged that he knew the system better than anyone, so he knew how to fix 
it. He told crowds “nobody knows the game better than me,” “I’ve been on the other side of it 
(the system), I know it better than anyone,” and “I know the system very well. I know the system 
better than anybody” (11/30/15, 6/29/16, 8/21/16). He often touted the fact that he donated to 
both Democrats and Republicans, and he knew the perks that came along with donating to 
politicians. He told crowds “I was a businessman, I gave to everyone,” and “I deal with 
politicians all my life, I’ve made a lot of money dealing with politicians” (10/10/15, 7/11/15). He 
would also tell stories about how he “was totally establishment, (politicians) would come to my 
office” (11/18/15). Trump told a crowd “I have seen first hand how the system is rigged against 
our citizens,” and asked another “do I know this business or what? I used to be a donor” 
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(7/21/16, 8/12/16). He made several other comments about knowing the system8 and donating to 
politicians.9 
 Along with knowing the politicians, another factor of knowing the system was his 
connections to lobbyists, “special interests,” hedge fund managers, and the other donors. He 
frequently made statements such as “I have lobbyists that can produce anything for me,” and “I 
know half of the lobbyists, I know so many lobbyists, I used to use them” (6/16/15, 1/26/16). He 
made many similar statements.10 He also made statements about he knew the “special interests,” 
hedge fund managers, and other donors. He told a crowd that he “knew so much about the 
lobbyists and special interests,” and another “my friends in the hedge fund business are going to 
start paying taxes” (6/2/16, 9/12/15). Finally, he referred to the fact that he knew other larger 
donors, saying “the money Jeb is spending is coming from friends of mine” (9/30/15). Trump’s 
contention that he could change the game relied on the fact that he knew its players.  
Another way that Trump articulated a connection to the elite was his mentions of 
members of the media, television personalities, and other celebrities. Trump complained about 
negative coverage coming from “reporters I’ve known for a long time” and told a crowd that “the 
head people from NBC came to my office and begged me not to run” (7/11/15, 8/17/15). He 
touted his status being closely tied to the elite by bragging “I was hosting Saturday Night 
Live…my mother and my father would never have believed it” (8/25/15). Trump mentioned that 
he knew other media personalities as well throughout the campaign, namely Don Lemon, Jeff 
Zucker (CEO of CNN), Joe Scarborough, Bill Maher, and Wolf Blitzer (9/30/15, 8/25/15, 
10/29/15, 1/26/16). Finally, he mentioned a couple of other celebrities who he knew, including 
                                               
8 8/17/15, 9/30/15, 10/10/15, 10/29/15, 11/18/15, 12/5/15, 12/21/15, 1/8/16, 2/19/16, 6/2/16, 6/29/16, 7/21/16, 
8/21/16, 10/29/16 
9 6/16/15, 7/25/15, 8/17/15, 9/12/15, 11/30/15, 12/21/15, 1/8/16, 1/26/16, 2/9/16, 5/27/16 
10 7/11/15, 7/25/15, 8/25/15, 10/10/15, 11/18/15, 1/8/16, 1/26/16, 8/21/16 
  
Quigley 70 
George Steinbrenner, Tom Brady, and “a friend of mine, one of the biggest celebrities in the 
world,” whom he left unnamed (11/30/15, 1/26/16, 10/29/15). 
 One final way Trump flouted his status as tied to the elite was by bragging about how 
rich he was and touting his elite education. He often bragged about how rich he was, saying “I’m 
really rich” (6/16/15, 10/29/15, 11/18/15, 3/12/16, 5/2/16). This bragging included touting how 
he was richer than his opponents, as he told a crowd “I have more money than all of my 
opponents combine,” and by joking “we’re closing loopholes on the very rich- that’s me, I don’t 
like that” (3/12/16, 9/30/15). Pointing to financial records he released, he told crowd several 
times “I’m richer than everyone thought I was.”11 Along with wealth, Trump also mentioned the 
tremendous assets he has, making statements such as “I have some of the greatest real estate in 
the world.”12 Finally, Trump fought back against claims that he is not smart by touting his elite 
education, telling crowds “I went to the Wharton school of finance.”13 By bragging about his 
wealth, assets, and education, Trump made it known to the crowds at his rallies that he was 
closely connected to the moneyed elite. 
 
How Trump fits into Mudde’s Definition of Populism  
New to Mudde’s definition were expectations that populists would identify their 
opponents as evil, call for a new party, support experts, and demonstrate a connection to the elite. 
Three of these components had mixed or small results. Trump identified his opponents as not 
evil 33 times during the speeches and identified his opponents as evil 29 times throughout the 
campaign: mixed results. Calling for a new party was not a major part of Trump’s campaign, as 
                                               
11 7/11/15, 7/25/15, 8/17/15, 10/10/15, 10/29/15, 11/18/15, 11/30/15, 2/29/16 
12 6/29/15, 12/5/15, 12/21/15, 1/8/16, 2/19/16, 3/12/16, 4/10/16, 4/27/16, 5/27/16, 8/12/16, 10/12/16, 10/29/16 
13 6/29/15, 7/11/15, 7/25/15. 8/17/15, 9/30/15, 10/10/15, 12/21/15, 1/26/16, 2/29/16, 4/27/16, 8/12/16, 9/16/16 
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he criticized Republicans only 23 times throughout the campaign. Trump made two statements 
supporting experts and 33 statements opposing them, not acting in the way Mudde contends that 
populists can act. However, one of the Mudde specific components surfaced 110 times during the 
speeches I listened: the expectation that populists connect themselves to the elite.  
Overall, Trump acted as Mudde would expect a populist would act in the most important 
way, by using the people/elite dichotomy, but the results on the other categories are mixed. He 
invoked a crisis of representation and connected himself to the elite, but the results on the rest of 
Mudde’s expectations are mixed at best. Trump fits into Mudde’s definition of populism, as he 
uses most of Mudde’s components in one way or another, but he fits better into Moffitt’s 
performative definition of populism. Table 1.5 shows how the Trump fit (and how he did not fit) 
into their definitions. Times when Trump acted differently than what they expected are in bold.  
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Table 1.5: Moffitt and Mudde Components of Populism with Results     
     Component of Populism                    Scholar                                         Results  
“The People”  Both Moffitt and Mudde 104 
“The Elite” Both Moffitt and Mudde 882 
Common Sense Both Moffitt and Mudde 12 
Crisis of Representation Both Moffitt and Mudde 457 
No negotiation, deliberation, 
compromise 
Both Moffitt and Mudde 82 
Open to negotiation, 
deliberation, compromise 
Both Moffitt and Mudde 25 
Populists target “Others” Moffitt 188 
Anti- “Political Correctness” Moffitt 18 
Opposed to Bureaucrats, 
Technocrats and Experts 
Moffitt 28 
Bad Manners Moffitt 117 
Opponents are evil Mudde 29 
Identifying Opponents as 
not evil 
Mudde 33 
Call for new party Mudde 23 
Support Republican Party Mudde 4 
Can Support Experts Mudde 2 
Connected to Elites Mudde 110 
 
Elite and Other Groups in Trumpian Populism 
 Traditionally, right-wing populists in America have attacked politicians and bureaucrats, 
both political parties, the media, African-Americans, protestors, intellectuals, and immigrants as 
the groups that have historically been a part of these groups. George Wallace, Ronald Reagan, 
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and the Tea Party all spoke out against politicians and bureaucrats, and Trump follows in their 
tradition in the attacking politicians but is less focused on attacking bureaucrats. Wallace, Nixon, 
Reagan, and the Tea Party all opposed the media, as did Trump. Trump often attacked 
undocumented immigrants, a tactic that was also embraced by the Tea Party. Finally, Wallace, 
Nixon and Reagan called out protestors (both at their own rallies and protestors in general), and 
Trump did as well. In these ways, Trump behaved in the tradition of past American right-wing 
populists.  
 On the topic of other groups, however, Trump did not attack both political parties, 
African-Americans, and intellectuals in the same way that past populists had. Wallace ran for 
President as an independent, which is not something Trump had to or chose to do. His attacks on 
both political parties were more similar to those used by the Tea Party, who attacked politicians 
while being clearly aligned with the Republican party. While Trump did attack Black Lives 
Matter, attacking African- Americans was not a major part of his campaign rhetoric and was not 
nearly as important to him as it was to Wallace and Nixon. Finally, while Trump did make 
several comments calling out intellectuals during the speeches, attacking intellectuals was far 
from a major part of the Trump campaign.  
 Trump also added a few new groups into the rhetoric of right-wing populism in America. 
Past right-wing populists such as Wallace, Nixon, and Reagan did not attack donors, lobbyists 
and “special interests” in the way Trump did. Similarly, none of these past populists spoke out 
against hedge fund managers, PACs, “Wall Street” and “Big business” as Trump did, a very 
interesting development. Perhaps a sign of the times, Trump was also the first to include 
Muslims and refugees in his populist rhetoric. While the groups Trump attacked the most, 
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politicians and the media, had been attacked by past populists, Trump used populist rhetoric to 
define “the elite” and “undeserving minority groups” in a different way than past populists.   
 
Conclusion 
Judged by his use of populist rhetoric, Trump is far from a perfect fit into either Moffitt 
or Mudde’s definitions of populism. While he often mentioned “the people,” invoked a crisis of 
representation, attacked “elites” and “others,” demonstrated bad manners and linked himself to 
the elite, his use of the other components expected of populists is mixed at best. Interestingly, 
Trump’s invocations of “the people” increased drastically at and after the Republican 
convention, pointing to a role of strategists in helping him hone his rhetoric in a more populist 
way. Trump attacked politicians and the media as past right-wing populists in America had, but 
his inclusions of groups such as donors, lobbyists, and “special interests” was a new 
development in right-wing populist rhetoric in America.  
As demonstrated in this paper, Trump’s populism was more similar to the performative 
populism that Moffitt describes than the ideological populism that Mudde describes. Trump 
demonstrated the main parts of both definitions, but he demonstrated bad manners and targeted 
“others” as Moffitt expects to a greater extent than any of the components that Mudde outlines. 
Furthermore, the Trump’s drastic increase in the use of the “the people” vs “the elite” dichotomy 
further points to the fact that populism is more of a performance than an ideology to Trump. 
Populists who ideologically believe what they are saying, instead of using populism as a 
performance, are more likely to push for populist policy outcomes. This is especially true in 
Trump’s case, as Trump’s policies since becoming President have seemingly done little to help 
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his white working-class base. Trump’s failure to deliver for this group could lead to their already 
low faith in government dropping even further.  
Along with this disparity between rhetoric and action, right-wing populism in America is 
dangerous because it inherently attacks institutions and norms that are important to our success 
thus far as a democratic government. The bad manners that Trump showed on the campaign trail 
are disturbing and the coarsening and dumbing-down of rhetoric in the political arena is 
problematic. Trump’s attacks on important democratic institutions, including the media and law 
enforcement agencies such as the FBI, hurt the public’s trust in these institutions, and thus our 
democracy at large. Institutions and norms are crucial in our democracy, and Trump’s continued 
attacks on them are harmful to democratic government in America.  
There are many different ways scholars could expand upon this thesis. A first path of 
inquiry would be to study Trump’s past and continued use of this rhetoric. This study only looks 
at campaign speeches, it would be interesting to examine whether this language continued, 
lessened, or increased after Trump took the oath of office. Trump was interested in politics long 
before his campaign for President in 2016, a look at speeches he gave earlier in his career and 
especially as he became more involved in politics during Obama’s presidency would allow 
scholars to find if Trump had always been populist, or if populism was unique to his run for 
President in 2016. Finally, since this study only looks at campaign speeches, other methods 
Trump used to communicate to voters, such as through debates and tweets, have been left out. 
An examination of Trump’s tweets from throughout the campaign could be another way to study 
Trump’s use of populist rhetoric as he ran for President.  
Furthermore, studying whether this language is specific to Trump or part of a larger Post-
Tea Party conservative phenomenon and whether Trump invented this specific kind of populist 
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rhetoric or picked it up from others would be fascinating. A look at whether Republican talk radio 
hosts such as Glenn Beck, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity used this language would be helpful 
in determining if Trump was echoing what he had heard others say or if the language was uniquely 
his. A look at whether Trump’s Republican opponents in the 2016 primaries used this language, 
or if they began using it as Trump became more successful, would also help in clarifying the origins 
of Trump’s populist rhetoric. Finally, studying more directly the links between Sarah Palin, the 
Tea Party, and Trump would allow scholars to examine if Trump is an extension of the Tea Party 
or something new entirely. The question of the origins of Trump’s populist rhetoric remains 
unanswered.    
The Donald Trump phenomena, which baffled the public, pundits, political scientists 
alike, is a topic that will be studied by political scientists and spoken about among pundits for 
generations to come. Many will describe him as a populist, which, while not a perfect definition, 
fits Trump quite well. Trump’s populism is more performative than ideological, as he fits into 
Moffitt’s definition better than Mudde’s and his use of populist rhetoric drastically increased as 
his campaign became more professional. Trump’s exclusionary, performative populism is 
dangerous, as it is largely disconnected from policy and attacks valuable institutions and norms. 
Trumpian populism is a disturbing development in recent American politics, and is dangerous to 
the health of American democracy.   
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Appendix 1.1 
 
Speeches:  
6/16/15 http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/  
7/11/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKeXxvOrTkI  
7/25/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOzs1BfHcXU  
8/17/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8kzIsLiZhDs 
8/25/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDYMC8wSC1Y  
9/12/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f42Gg55Xmq0  
9/30/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxTwdjzZt5c  
10/10/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQXXytNw0Do  
10/29/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QKs_qDJe0bs  
11/18/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiLovCRilJY  
11/30/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3c6za9xw5Ko  
12/5/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEkHBtVYqJA  
12/21/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXeFm0OecKk  
1/8/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV1t3Ppa9dw  
1/26/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkANNBt_uLw  
2/19/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfUxoOFk0HI  
2/29/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HVjemTen0P8  
3/12/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_2DgkKUwr4  
3/19/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=26JeLvGXbas  
4/10/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xVs69_aWvpY  
4/2716 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_YDdcZ9oo4  
5/2/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_nbTt9KJ6Sc  
5/26/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqRkv9VTaMQ  
6/2/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sppj-0RRYH8  
6/29/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSwkNWgbhto  
7/12/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dM6o3D9rTVE  
7/21/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=34Svt3kfq1c  
8/12/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFz51NcVBhQ  
8/22/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RWKz9zYNUzM  
9/6/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKnK0NKByhg  
9/16/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jEVyT_EbkPo  
10/12/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dni4DBIdXtw  
10/29/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pf_2CGUSLHg  
11/7/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pRBRsSSByMA  
11/9/16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qsvy10D5rtc  
  
